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ABSTRACT 
The United States is obligated under the Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) treaty to make patent rights 
available and enjoyable without discrimination as to the “field of 
technology” of the invention. No specific areas of technology may be 
singled out for unjustified special treatment. Yet the United States is 
doing just that with respect to computer-implemented business 
methods. Doctrinally, such methods are subject to an especially high 
bar for patentability. Statutorily, patents on such methods may be 
challenged in invalidity proceedings that are exclusively available for 
so-called “covered business method patents.” The law seems to reflect 
skepticism that computer-implemented business methods should be 
broadly eligible for patenting, as well as distaste for how many owners 
of such patents have enforced their rights. While these may be real 
problems and serious policy challenges, blatant discrimination by 
technological field is not a proper solution. 
The United States’ handling of computer-implemented business 
methods goes far beyond the kind of justifiable differential treatment 
that TRIPS tolerates. In the pharmaceutical context, for example, the 
inventions are subject to unique regulations and market restrictions. 
A country’s patent laws may properly extend the term of a drug patent 
to offset a lengthy regulatory review period or may properly allow 
generic drug makers to begin seeking their own regulatory approval 
during the patent term. For computer-implemented business methods, 
the legal differences in treatment correspond to no specific aspects of 
the subject matter, but arguably reflect broader problems in the 
                                                 
  Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Akron School of Law; Of 
Counsel, The Webb Law Firm. This research project was generously supported by a 
grant from the University of Akron School of Law. Thanks to John Duffy, Christian 
Ehret, Ryan Holte, Camilla Hrdy, Mark Lemley, and Josh Sarnoff for helpful 
discussions and comments. Thanks also to the participants at the 2017 IP Scholars 
Conference hosted by Cardozo Law School, where this paper was presented. The 
views expressed in this Article, as well as any errors, are my own. Questions and 
comments are welcome to dbrean@uakron.edu. 
308 Michigan State Law Review  2018 
United States patent system concerning patent examination quality 
and litigation abuse.  
None of this discrimination is in violation of the treaty, however, 
unless computer-implemented business methods are a “field of 
technology” under TRIPS. Congress and the USPTO have ostensibly 
assumed not, focusing on the fact that such methods use existing 
computer technology but do not create new computer technology per 
se. But that goes to how inventive the method is, not whether it is 
technological. The text of the treaty, the pre- and post-ratification 
conduct of the member countries, and the historical and normative 
context all suggest that computer-implemented business methods are 
indeed technological. While the computerization of such processes is 
not usually inventive enough to ultimately be patented, employing 
computers for practical business purposes nonetheless brings such 
methods within the scope of the treaty and deserves nondiscriminatory 
treatment. As the United States considers more changes to the 
availability and enjoyment of patent rights, it should discontinue this 
discrimination. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A multi-national treaty, the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), provides that all 
member countries, including the United States, shall make patent 
protection available and enjoyable for inventions in all technological 
fields.1 Specifically, pursuant to TRIPS Article 27(1), member 
countries must grant patents for: 
any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, 
provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of 
industrial application. . . . [P]atents shall be available and patent rights 
enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of 
technology and whether products are imported or locally produced.2 
Nothing in TRIPS purports to categorically exclude, or permit 
the exclusion of, computer-implemented business methods from 
patent-eligibility.3 But U.S. patent law has done exactly that. The 
Supreme Court, Congress, and the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office 
have all sharply curtailed patent availability and enjoyment in that area 
over the past decade. 
In the courts, the case law has evolved rapidly concerning patent 
eligibility and 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). Section 101 broadly defines 
patent-eligible subject matter as “any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and 
useful improvement thereof.”4 But judicially created exceptions to § 
101 have long excluded laws of nature, natural phenomena, and 
abstract ideas from patent protection.5 Since 2010, the Supreme Court 
has issued no fewer than four landmark decisions concerning the 
exceptions to § 101. The decisions—Bilski, Mayo, Myriad, and 
Alice—collectively bolster those judicial exceptions and considerably 
                                                 
 1. TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of International Property 
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
 2. Id. art. 27(1) (emphasis added). 
 3. Id. art. 27. 
 4. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 5. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981). 
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reduce the scope of patent-eligible subject matter.6 Data from Lex 
Machina shows that the number of patents invalidated on § 101 
grounds after Alice has been suddenly dwarfing all other grounds of 
invalidity in court decisions:7 
 
 
 
Software and business method patents have been hit particularly 
hard by this doctrinal shift.8 Many such patents do not improve 
                                                 
 6. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) 
(finding computerized intermediated settlement method ineligible for patent 
protection); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 
(2013) (finding isolated DNA sequences indicating breast cancer mutation to be a 
patent-ineligible natural phenomenon); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus 
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012) (finding medical diagnostic method directed to patent-
ineligible law of nature); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (finding method of 
hedging risk unpatentably abstract). 
 7. BRIAN C. HOWARD & JASON MAPLES, LEX MACHINA PATENT LITIGATION 
YEAR IN REVIEW 2016, 27 fig. 43 (2017).  
 8. In the first two years after Alice, software patents and business method 
patents accounted for 45.8% and 22.4% of patents challenged in federal courts under 
§ 101, respectively, with 45% and 26.3% of those challenged patents being 
invalidated, respectively. Robert R. Sachs, Two Years After Alice: A Survey of the 
Impact of a “Minor Case”, BILSKI BLOG (June 16, 2016), 
http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2016/06/two-years-after-alice-a-survey-of-the-
impact-of-a-minor-case.html/ [https://perma.cc/7KG8-4DBS]; see also Steven 
Seidenberg, Business-Method and Software Patents May Go Through the Looking 
Glass After Alice Decision, ABA J. (Feb. 2015), http://www.abajournal.com/ 
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computer technology, but use it in conventional ways to facilitate 
some new means of performing economic or other electronic 
activities. This, under the new law, is generally not patent-eligible and 
is considered an attempt to patent an abstract idea by merely 
computerizing it.9 As one commentator concluded, “[T]echnically, 
software and business methods are patent eligible in the U.S., but in 
practice, the level of protection that they now enjoy is much lower 
than it used to be and possibly lower than what is provided to 
inventions in other fields.”10 Indeed, about two-thirds of Alice-based 
challenges to claims have been successful in district court.11 On 
                                                 
magazine/article/business_method_and_software_patents_may_go_through_the_loo
king_glass_after/ [https://perma.cc/8ADB-KM8W] (“In almost every case since Alice 
in which a party asserted that such patents consisted of ineligible subject matter, the 
courts have concurred and struck down the patent. In just four months, the district 
courts and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit have thrown out 14 such 
patents. That is equal to the total number of all patents struck down in 2013 for 
ineligible subject matter.”). 
 9. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359 (deeming computerized method of 
facilitating intermediated settlement patent-ineligible because “each step does no 
more than require a generic computer to perform generic computer functions”); 
Enfish, L.L.C. v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (deeming 
claim patent-eligible because “the plain focus of the claims is on an improvement to 
computer functionality itself, not on economic or other tasks for which a computer is 
used in its ordinary capacity”). 
 10. Stefania Fusco, TRIPS Non-Discrimination Principle: Are Alice and 
Bilski Really the End of NPEs?, 24 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 131, 133 (2016) (citing 
John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Method Patent Myth, 18 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 987 (2003)). 
 11. Sixty-seven percent of all § 101 motions filed from the day that Alice was 
decided (June 19, 2014) through the end of 2015 were granted in whole or in part. See 
2015 YEAR IN REVIEW, DOCKET NAVIGATOR ANALYTICS 27 (2016). Plus, those 
software and business method claims are being invalidated earlier in litigation 
proceedings, increasingly often at the pleadings stage, and without the benefit of claim 
construction or discovery. See id. at 29 (showing that fifty-seven § 101 motions were 
filed in the “early stage” versus 136 in the “mature stage” of the litigation from Alice 
through 2015, though the success rates were comparable overall); Seidenberg, supra 
note 8 (“[I]n the wake of Alice, courts are ruling on patent eligibility earlier in the 
litigation process. Instead of waiting until summary judgment to strike down patents 
for ineligible subject matter, a number of courts have issued such rulings on motions 
to dismiss.”); Michael Wilburn, Pretrial Dismissals and Judgments in Post-Alice 
Courts, LAW360 (Apr. 23, 2015, 10:22 AM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/642593/pretrial-dismissals-and-judgments-in-post-
alice-courts [https://perma.cc/LZS4-KHUK] (“In the wake of Alice . . . many courts 
are willing to grant pretrial dismissal of patent infringement cases based on patent-
ineligible subject matter. Courts have cited to Circuit Judge Haldane Robert Mayer’s 
concurrence to address the Section 101 issue ‘at the very outset’ of a case. Since Alice, 
there have been more than 60 cases that address pretrial dispositive motions based on 
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appeal, over 90% of § 101 cases have gone against the patent owner.12 
This is well above historical averages for invalidity challenge success 
rates.13 
Congress, for its part, targeted those same patents in a different 
way. As an alternative to district court litigation, and alongside two 
other subject-matter-neutral proceedings, Congress created a special 
proceeding that allows any person to challenge a “covered business 
method” (CBM) patent at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.14 
Challenges to CBM patents may be made on any ground of 
patentability, including § 101.15 Although the CBM program 
supposedly was not intended to redefine the boundaries of patentable 
subject matter,16 the scope of patents within the reach of this program 
is largely coextensive with the business methods that the courts now 
deem ineligible.17 And patent claims that reach a final judgment in the 
CBM program are being invalidated at extremely high rates—more 
                                                 
patent-ineligible subject matter. In over 70 percent of those cases, the court granted 
or affirmed dismissal. Remarkably, courts granted 11 of the 15 motions to dismiss 
under Rule 12(b)(6), thus affirming invalidity at the earliest stage of litigation.”); 
Statistics on District Court 12(b)(6) Motions Under 35 USC 101, DOCKETREPORT 
(Feb. 27, 2017), http://docketreport.blogspot.com/2017/02/ 
statistics-on-district-court-12b6.html [https://perma.cc/VY8D-73YB] (showing a 
12(b)(6) dismissal on § 101 grounds happening three times in 2013 and increasing to 
forty times in 2016).  
 12. See Paul R. Gugliuzza & Mark A. Lemley, Can a Court Change the Law 
By Saying Nothing?, 71 VAND. L. REV. 765, 787 (2018) (“[T]he Federal Circuit has 
allowed patents to survive in only eight of 104 total decisions on patentable subject 
matter since Alice, an invalidity rate of 92.3%.”). 
 13. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the 
Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 187, 205 (1998) (noting the 46% 
invalidity rate in final district court or Federal Circuit decisions from 1989 to 1996); 
Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases - An Empirical Peek Inside the 
Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 380, 390 (2000) (noting the 33% invalidity rate 
found in patent cases that went to trial from 1983 to 1999). 
 14. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub L. No. 112-29, § 18, 125 Stat. 
284, 329-31 (2011) [hereinafter AIA § 18]. 
 15. See id. § 18(a)(1)(A) (incorporating standard of § 321(b) pertaining to 
post-grant review proceedings). 
 16. See id. § 18(e). 
 17. See Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1327 (Fed. 
Cir. 2015) (“As the PTAB correctly noted, even if the invention required the use of a 
computer, the claim did not constitute a technological invention. As we are now 
instructed, the presence of a general purpose computer to facilitate operations through 
uninventive steps does not change the fundamental character of an invention.”) (citing 
Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014)). 
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than 80%.18 Through the end of 2015, of the CBM proceedings that 
reached final written decisions where § 101 was decided, forty 
decisions held the claims ineligible and only one decision held the 
claims eligible.19 Patent owners defending against CBM proceedings 
are also subject to special substantive and procedural disadvantages 
relating to parallel litigation.20 
The creation of the CBM program was ostensibly motivated by 
two related factors: (1) skepticism concerning the quality and strength 
of many business method patents; and (2) the observation that patent 
assertion entities (PAEs), also known as “patent trolls,” have wielded 
weak business method patents to obtain many settlement payments in 
mass litigation campaigns.21 Computer-implemented business 
                                                 
 18. See Patent Trial and Appeal Board Statistics, USPTO 11 (Feb. 28, 2017), 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/aia_statistics_ 
february2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/6GK2-G76E] (showing that 81% of all final 
written decisions result in all challenged claims being invalidated (representing 29% 
of total petitions), with another 15% of final written decisions resulting in some 
challenged claims being invalidated (representing 5% of total petitions)); see also 
Elliot C. Cook, Daniel F. Klodowski & David C. Seastrunk, AIA Blog: Claim and 
Case Disposition, FINNEGAN, http://www.aiablog.com/claim-and-case-disposition/ 
[https://perma.cc/H55D-BE6X] (last visited Mar. 19, 2018); Philip Swain, The 
Remarkable Effectiveness of Alice v CLS Bank Challenges at the PTAB, PTAB BLOG 
(Oct. 23, 2015), http://www.ptab-blog.com/2015/10/23/the-remarkable-
effectiveness-of-alice-v-cls-bank-challenges-at-the-ptab/ [https://perma.cc/9G85-
QNRZ]. 
 19. See BRIAN C. HOWARD, LEX MACHINA PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL 
BOARD (PTAB) 2015 REPORT 5 (Jan. 2016), http://pages.lexmachina.com/rs/098-
SHZ-498/images/Lex%20Machina%20PTAB%202015%20Report.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/MNJ3-DEQE].  
 20. See infra Part I.B (describing CBM requirements related to parallel 
litigation). 
 21. See H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 54 (2011) (“A number of patent observers 
believe the issuance of poor [quality] business-method patents during the late 1990’s 
through the early 2000’s led to the patent ‘troll’ lawsuits that compelled the 
Committee to launch the patent reform project 6 years ago.”); OIP Techs., Inc. v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Mayer, J., concurring) 
(explaining that employing § 101 against patents early in litigation “works to stem the 
tide of vexatious suits brought by the owners of vague and overbroad business method 
patents”). Patent assertion entities’ (PAEs) monetization efforts are highly 
controversial, with opinions that range from deeming such PAEs extortionate bottom-
feeders to opinions that their enforcement activities bolster the patent marketplace and 
allow small businesses to secure critical financing and competitive footing. See, e.g., 
Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2128 (2013) (“The logic of the criticism is straightforward: 
These patent trolls do not themselves invent anything but buy patents from others, 
and, because they do not even care whether the patents they buy are any good, they 
impose substantial costs on innovative companies without contributing anything to 
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practices are the clear favorite type of patent asserted by PAEs.22 
Those kinds of methods—involving, e.g., online shopping, digital 
marketing, and payment processing—tend to be widely used by many 
successful businesses, allowing a single patent to be enforced against 
many such businesses to collect license or settlement fees from each.23 
                                                 
the world. Hence, some critics say, the problem with the patent system is trolls 
asserting too many patents and, in particular, too many weak patents.”); Ronald J. 
Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 
961, 1024 (2005) (“[T]rolls are serving a function as intermediaries that specialize in 
litigation to exploit the value of patents that cannot be exploited effectively by those 
that have originally obtained them.”); Elizabeth Pesses, Patent and Contribution: 
Bringing the Quid Pro Quo into eBay v. MercExchange, 11 YALE J.L. & TECH. 309, 
328 (2009) (“Nonetheless, patent trolls may actually play an important role in the 
patent system. For example, many small inventors do not have the financial resources 
to enforce their patents, and these patents are constantly infringed by larger 
companies.”); Mike Masnick, President Obama Admits that Patent Trolls Just Try to 
‘Extort’ Money; Reform Needed, TECHDIRT (Feb. 14, 2013), 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130214/ 
14351821988/president-obama-admits-that-patent-trolls-just-try-to-extort-money-
reform-needed.shtml [https://perma.cc/H34D-ZPQU] (quoting President Obama as 
saying that “[PAEs] don’t actually produce anything themselves . . . [t]hey’re just 
trying to essentially leverage and hijack somebody else’s idea and see if they can 
extort some money out of them”). 
 22. See John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Extreme Value 
or Trolls on Top? The Characteristics of the Most-Litigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1, 3 (2009) (“The most-litigated patents are far more likely to be software and 
telecommunications patents, not mechanical or other types of patents. They are 
significantly different from once-litigated patents in ways that signal their value up 
front. And they are disproportionately owned by nonpracticing entities (i.e., 
‘trolls’).”); see also 2015 Report NPE Litigation, Patent Marketplace, and NPE Cost, 
RPX RATIONAL PATENT 30 (2015), https://www.rpxcorp.com/wp-
content/uploads/sites/2/2016/07/RPX-2015-Report-072616.FinalZ.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J2FY-NG4D] (showing that “e-commerce and software” were by 
far the most common types of patents asserted by non-practicing entities in 2015, 
making up 36% of targeted defendants). 
 23. See Ed Black, Patent Trolls: The Innovation Hijackers, FORBES (Feb. 28, 
2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/edblack/2013/02/28/153/#13780ec8677a 
[https://perma.cc/7LTE-JSYL] (“Individuals or companies claim to own patents to 
ubiquitous features of the Internet-enabled economy — such as using a virtual 
shopping cart online, updating smartphone apps, scrolling through pages, or serving 
ads in an online video.”). 
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Making such methods largely ineligible for patent protection greatly 
diminishes the “in terrorem power”24 of PAEs, albeit indirectly.25  
To be clear, Congress had plenty of opportunities in recent years 
to more directly deter the offending conduct of the PAEs, involving 
some combination of increasing pleading requirements, limiting 
discovery, and enhancing fee shifting against PAEs.26 Instead, 
Congress targeted the subject matter of the PAEs’ patents of choice. 
Altogether, U.S. patent law affords remarkably special treatment 
to computerized business methods. The singling out of a specific class 
of subject matter raises the question of whether the law complies with 
TRIPS’ proscription not to deny patent protection or patent enjoyment 
in discriminatory ways.27 Answering that question involves three 
central inquiries: (1) whether the special treatment is the kind of 
discrimination that TRIPS prohibits; (2) whether computerized 
business methods are “fields of technology” subject to the anti-
discrimination requirement; and (3) if so, whether such discrimination 
may be justified by other TRIPS provisions.28 This Article addresses 
these questions in depth. 
Importantly, this Article does not address related questions such 
as whether computerized business methods should be patentable in the 
U.S., whether such already-issued patents are of good or bad quality, 
whether PAEs help or hinder the economy, or whether the CBM 
program is beneficial for the patent system. There is already ample 
commentary about such topics.29 
                                                 
 24. See Commil U.S.A., L.L.C. v. Cisco Sys., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1932 (2015) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that a good-faith belief in the invalidity of a patent 
should negate an intent to actively induce infringement, and commenting “if the 
desirability of the rule we adopt were a proper consideration, it is by no means clear 
that the Court’s holding, which increases the in terrorem power of patent trolls, is 
preferable”). 
 25. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 54 (2011); OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at 
1364 (Mayer, J., concurring). 
 26. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 114-235 (2015); Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 
113th Cong. (2013); Patent Abuse Reduction Act, S. 1013, 113th Cong. § 285A 
(2013); SHIELD Act, H.R. 6245, 112th Cong. § 229A (2012). 
 27. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 
15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 469 (enacting the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights, or TRIPS). Patent rights are to be “enjoyable without discrimination 
as to the place of invention, the field of technology, and whether products are imported 
or locally produced.” Id. 
 28. Id.  
 29. See, e.g., John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Method 
Patent Myth, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 987, 990 (2003) (“We find that Internet 
business method patents actually fare quite well statistically, contrary to the 
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This Article focuses on whether the law violates TRIPS because 
that alone is a timely and important question. Stakeholders are heavily 
lobbying to amend § 101 in ways that would change the law in favor 
of computerized business methods, effectively undoing the recent 
                                                 
conventional wisdom that Internet business method patents issued during the early 
years of their recognition were much worse than others—that they were somehow 
exceptional.”); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. 
L. REV. 1575, 1632 (2003) (“Some suggest that software patents are inappropriate 
altogether, while others contend that only Internet business method patents are.”); 
Colleen V. Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 461, 474 (2014) 
(“In addition to financial impacts, PAE demands can also harm the survival and 
operation of a small company. Although PAE suits are often called ‘nuisance’ suits, 
one of the most significant findings of this study is that, among small company 
respondents to the survey, many reported one or more significant operational impacts. 
Receiving a demand was described as potentially representing a ‘death knell’ for a 
prefunded company: no one wants to invest in a company where founder time and 
investor money is going to be ‘bled to patent trolls,’ as one interviewee put it.”); Alan 
L. Durham, “Useful Arts” in the Information Age, 1999 BYU L. REV. 1419, 1527-28 
(arguing that business methods involving computers should not be patented unless 
they “lead to significant progress in the ‘useful art’ of computer programming . . . 
[h]owever, the patent claim should reflect the art of programming; it should reflect 
the substantive details that belong to the programming art and that enable the 
technological implementation of the non-technological plan”); Lemley & Melamed, 
supra note 21, at 2180 (“Patent trolls are taking the rap for problems with the patent 
system. That is not to say trolls are not a problem; they are a large and growing one. 
But they are not the problem. Rather, they are a symptom of systemic issues the patent 
system faces in the IT industry.”); David Orozco, Administrative Patent Levers, 117 
PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 17 (2012) (“The social costs of overly broad business method 
patents are amplified when they fall into the hands of the so-called patent trolls.”); 
Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457, 459 (2012) (“NPEs 
are not, however, without their defenders. According to their proponents, NPEs create 
patent markets, and those markets enhance investment in start-up companies by 
providing additional liquidity options. NPEs help businesses crushed by larger 
competitors—competitors who infringe valid patents with impunity. NPEs allow 
individual inventors to monetize their inventions. These functions, the proponents 
argue, justify the existence of NPEs.”); John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal 
Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139, 1163-70 (1999) (arguing that business methods 
are not in the realm of technology and should not be patented). 
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slew of Supreme Court cases.30 And Congress has been considering31 
whether to extend or expand the CBM program beyond its current 
scope and expiration date in 2020.32  
                                                 
 30. The Intellectual Property Owners Association, the American Intellectual 
Property Lawyers Association, and the American Bar Association’s Intellectual 
Property Law Section have proposed amendments to § 101 that would greatly expand 
the scope of patentable subject matter. See Letter from Donna P. Suchy, Section Chair, 
American Bar Association, to Michelle K. Lee, Dir., USPTO (Mar. 28, 2017), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/intellectual_ 
property_law/advocacy/advocacy-20170328-comments.authcheckdam.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/SHX2-8LMR] (adding, inter alia, a provision that says: “A claim for a 
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any useful 
improvement thereof, may be denied eligibility under this section 101 on the ground 
that the scope of the exclusive rights under such a claim would preempt the use by 
others of all practical applications of a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract 
idea. Patent eligibility under this section shall not be negated when a practical 
application of a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea is the subject 
matter of the claims upon consideration of those claims as a whole, whereby each and 
every limitation of the claims shall be fully considered and none ignored”); Proposed 
Amendments to Patent Eligible Subject Matter Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, INTELL. PROP. 
OWNERS ASS’N (Feb. 7, 2017), http://www.ipo.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/02/20170207_IPO-101-TF-Proposed-Amendments-and-
Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3X4-Q8E9] (adding, inter alia, a provision that says 
“[a] claimed invention is ineligible . . . if and only if the claimed invention as a whole, 
as understood by a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed 
invention pertains, exists in nature independently of and prior to any human activity, 
or exists solely in the human mind”); AIPLA Legislative Proposal and Report on 
Patent Eligible Subject Matter, AIPLA 4 (May 12, 2017), 
https://www.aipla.org/resources2/reports/2017AIPLADirect/Documents/AIPLA%20
Report%20on%20101%20Reform-5-19-17-Errata.pdf [https://perma.cc/CBE5-
JCKM] (adding, inter alia, a provision stating that “[a] claimed invention is ineligible 
. . . only if the claimed invention as a whole exists in nature independent of and prior 
to any human activity, or can be performed solely in the human mind”). 
 31. See Patent Quality Improvement Act of 2013, S. 866, 113th Cong. § 2 
(2013); see also Dennis Crouch, AIA Trials and the Sunsetting of Covered-Business-
Method Review, PatentlyO.com (March 21, 2018), https://patentlyo.com/patent/ 
2018/03/sunsetting-covered-business.html (“Rep. Issa is heading-up hearings and a 
review of the program to consider whether the CBM program should be made 
permanent and potentially expanded beyond its current narrow scope. Issa has stated 
he sees the program as a more efficient mechanism for eliminating low quality 
patents.”). At least one informal survey suggests that stakeholders have strong and 
disparate opinions about whether the CBM program should be maintained, extended, 
or expanded. See No Real Consensus Yet on CBM Sunsetting, PATENTLY-O (May 15, 
2017), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/05/real-consensus-sunsetting.html [https:// 
perma.cc/HCB8-S83Y] (showing that 44% of the 240 surveyed readers would allow 
the CBM program to sunset as scheduled, but all others would extend the program, 
with 27% of the surveyed readers contending that the scope of patents eligible for the 
program should be expanded to other types of patents). While some respondents 
lauded the program for effectively eliminating low quality patents, others believed 
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Congress failed to directly evaluate TRIPS Article 27(1) 
compliance when establishing the CBM program as part of the AIA. 
The final committee report for the AIA fails to mention TRIPS at all.33 
But regarding a predecessor bill, the 2007 Patent Reform Act, the 
committee determined that a law prohibiting the patenting of tax 
strategies34 would not run afoul of TRIPS Article 27(1) because it 
concluded that “business methods were not included as a ‘field of 
technology’” based on other TRIPS signatories’ laws and negotiating 
positions.35 The Committee Report cited to evidence that, before 
TRIPS was ratified in 1994, countries did not patent business methods 
(though some, like the U.S., later did), suggesting that TRIPS does not 
prescribe that such methods be patentable.36 Alternatively, the 
Committee Report suggested that the ban on tax strategy patents 
would be justified under TRIPS Article 27(3), which “allows members 
to exclude from patentability inventions that are necessary to protect 
ordre public or morality,” because such patents would be contrary to 
tax policy and would incentivize exploitation of tax loopholes.37  
Notably, the 2007 committee left open the possibility that 
computerized business methods may be considered a field of 
technology.38 And when discussing a provision that allows third 
parties to submit prior art, the committee noted that patent examiners 
have a hard time locating relevant prior art in “such areas of 
technology [as] computer software and systems, processes 
implemented by or involving computers, and processes that do not 
necessarily involve what is commonly thought of as technology, such 
as methods of doing business.”39 
                                                 
that the worst of those patents had now been invalidated and there was no need to 
extend the program. Id. 
 32. The CBM program was created as “transitional,” with a provision 
causing the CBM program to end eight years after the USPTO regulations 
implementing the program took effect. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 
No. 112-29, § 18(a)(3), 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
 33. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 112-98 (2011). 
 34. A similar provision was later included in the AIA. See Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act § 14(a) (“For purposes of evaluating an invention under section 
102 or 103 of title 35, United States Code, any strategy for reducing, avoiding, or 
deferring tax liability, whether known or unknown at the time of the invention or 
application for patent, shall be deemed insufficient to differentiate a claimed invention 
from the prior art.”). 
 35. H.R. REP. NO. 110-314, at 38-39 (2007). 
 36. See id.  
 37. See id.  
 38. See id. at 37. 
 39. See id. (emphasis added). 
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There were also earlier actions by Congress in response to public 
outcry against business method patents:40 (1) the enacted (but later 
repealed via the AIA) 1999 First Inventor Defense Act,41 which 
provided a special defense to infringement for prior users of business 
methods; and (2) the very similar, but never-enacted, Business Method 
Improvement Acts of 2000 and 2001,42 which made patenting business 
methods more difficult by raising the nonobviousness threshold and 
calling for post-grant proceedings for business methods. In neither 
instance does it appear that Congress was mindful of TRIPS Article 
27, as none of the remarks or reports mention this provision or allude 
to international patent non-discrimination obligations.43 
It is against this backdrop, where Congress conducted only a 
cursory and oblique review of TRIPS discrimination against 
computerized business methods before creating the CBM program, 
that a more robust analysis of TRIPS compliance should be conducted 
before any decisions are made to end, extend, or expand the program, 
or to modify § 101. 
Part I of this Article details how U.S. law treats computer-
implemented business methods for purposes of patent eligibility and 
enforceability, showing that the special treatment appears to constitute 
unlawful discrimination. Part II explores whether computer-
implemented business methods are a “field of technology” implicating 
the non-discrimination requirement. Part III examines whether the 
                                                 
 40. See Allison & Tiller, supra note 29, at 993-94 (“Although patents in other 
areas of technology have brought forth complaints from various quarters, the 
magnitude of adverse commentary and reportage on business method patents has been 
unprecedented.”). 
 41. See 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2000). 
 42. See Business Method Patent Improvement Act of 2000, H.R. 5364, 106th 
Cong. § 4 (2000); Business Method Patent Improvement Act of 2001, H.R. 1332, 
107th Cong. § 4 (2001) (“A business method invention shall be presumed obvious 
under this section if the only significant difference between the combined teachings 
of the prior art and the claimed invention is that the claimed invention is appropriate 
for use with a computer technology, unless—(A) the application of the computer 
technology is novel; or (B) the computer technology is novel and not the subject of 
another patent or patent application.”). 
 43. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 106-287 (1999); H.R. REP. NO. 106-464 
(1999) (Conf. Rep.); 146 CONG. REC. E1651 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 2000) (statement of 
Rep. Boucher); 146 CONG. REC. E1659 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 2000) (statement of Rep. 
Berman); Business Method Patent Improvement Act of 2001, H.R. 1332, 107th Cong. 
(2001); Patent Improvement Act of 2001, H.R. 1333, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. Res. 
110, 107th Cong. (2001); 147 CONG. REC. E518 (daily ed. Apr. 3, 2001) (statement of 
Rep. Berman). 
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discrimination as to computer-implemented business methods may be 
justified by other TRIPS provisions.  
I. DISCRIMINATION AGAINST COMPUTER-IMPLEMENTED  
BUSINESS METHODS 
This Part details the recent judicial and legislative developments 
surrounding patent eligibility. Even if the doctrine could be viewed as 
facially field neutral, precedent may be selectively applied to 
disproportionately invalidate computerized business method patents.44 
The CBM program created by Congress, however, is more 
deliberately targeted to discriminate against computer-implemented 
business methods.45 
There are essentially two ways that patent laws might 
improperly discriminate against subject matter—de jure and de facto. 
As explained by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, “Discrimination 
may arise from explicitly different treatment, sometimes called ‘de 
jure discrimination,’ but it may also arise from ostensibly identical 
treatment which, due to differences in circumstances, produces 
differentially disadvantageous effects, sometimes called ‘de facto 
discrimination.’”46 De facto discrimination may be shown not only by 
discriminatory effects, but also by discriminatory purpose—i.e., 
                                                 
 44. See generally Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) 
(holding that abstract idea of intermediated settlement not patentable and that method 
claims requiring generic computer implementation failed to transform abstract idea of 
intermediated settlement into patentable invention); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. 
Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (holding synthetically created DNA not 
naturally occurring, and patent eligibility was therefore not precluded); Mayo 
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs. Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012) (holding that 
patents effectively claimed underlying laws of nature themselves and were thus 
invalid); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (holding that business method was 
unpatentable abstract idea).  
 45. See Orozco, supra note 29, at 49 (discussing administrative 
discrimination by the USPTO against business methods and explaining that the 
USPTO implemented a number of business-method-specific procedures in response 
to the essentially same “fire alarms” that prompted the CBM program discussed infra). 
These special USPTO procedures involve designating expert examiners, mandating 
certain searching databases, “second pair of eyes” review, and improved searching 
capabilities, but do not directly bear on the patentability or enjoyment of patent rights 
in business methods and, as such, are beyond the scope of this Article. Id. at 32-36. 
 46. Panel Report, Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS114/R, 171 (adopted Mar. 17, 2000) [hereinafter Canadian 
Pharmaceuticals], https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/7428d.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/2X8Q-F8MT]. 
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whether a discriminatory motivation may be inferred from the 
objective characteristics of the law.47 
Part I.A shows that judicial discrimination against computer-
implemented business methods appears to be at least de facto, while 
Part I.B shows that the CBM program is almost certainly de jure 
discrimination. Part I.C then confirms that this discrimination goes 
beyond the kind of differential treatment that would be justified if 
based on unique characteristics of the subject matter. 
A. Judicial Discrimination 
Recent post-Alice precedent has essentially precluded patent 
protection for methods where the invention is not improving computer 
technology but involves the use of computer technology to accomplish 
some non-technological objective. But this case law is in tension with 
Alice and other Supreme Court precedent that would allow a 
somewhat broader scope of computerized business methods to be 
patented. Courts are not only embracing the more restrictive 
precedent, but are doing so to invalidate computerized business 
method patents at surprisingly high rates and at surprisingly early 
stages of litigation. Whether there are discriminatory motives in place 
is unclear, however. 
1. Alice and Its Aftermath in the Federal Circuit 
Any in-depth discussion of Alice deserves at least a brief 
discussion of Bilski, which cleared the path for Alice. Although Bilski 
held that the risk-hedging method there (which was not claimed as 
computerized) was too abstract to be patented,48 the majority 
determined that at least some methods of doing business must be 
                                                 
 47. See id. at 173 (“Two main issues figure in the application of [de facto 
discrimination] in most legal systems. One is the question of de facto discriminatory 
effect - whether the actual effect of the measure is to impose differentially 
disadvantageous consequences on certain parties. The other, related to the justification 
for the disadvantageous effects, is the issue of purpose - not an inquiry into the 
subjective purposes of the officials responsible for the measure, but an inquiry into 
the objective characteristics of the measure from which one can infer the existence or 
non- existence of discriminatory objectives.”). 
 48. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 612 (“These claims attempt to patent the use of the 
abstract idea of hedging risk in the energy market and then instruct the use of well-
known random analysis techniques to help establish some of the inputs into the 
equation.”). 
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patent-eligible “processes” within the meaning of § 101.49 The 
majority also emphasized the importance of § 101’s flexibility to 
accommodate new inventions.50 Though Bilski was not a software 
case, the majority went out of its way to recognize that that the 
ubiquity of computers in this Information Age democratizes a lot of 
innovation (e.g., software) that might well be patent eligible.51 The 
concurring minority would have ruled, based largely on historical 
practices, that all methods of doing business were outside the scope of 
§ 101.52 Ultimately, aside from pointing to past precedent and rejecting 
the Federal Circuit’s exclusive “machine-or-transformation” test as 
only an “important clue” to patent eligibility, the Court declined to 
provide any particular test.53 
In Alice, the Court crystallized a patent-eligibility analytical 
framework and applied it specifically in the context of a computer-
implemented business method.54 The claims in Alice involved methods 
for facilitating intermediated settlement—essentially creating 
computerized debit and credit records in an escrow situation to 
mitigate the risk that only one party will perform the exchange.55 The 
Court announced a two-step test for determining whether the claims 
were eligible: 
First, we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those 
patent-ineligible concepts. If so, we then ask, “[w]hat else is there in the 
claims before us?” To answer that question, we consider the elements of 
each claim both individually and “as an ordered combination” to determine 
whether the additional elements “transform the nature of the claim” into a 
patent-eligible application. We have described step two of this analysis as a 
search for an “‘inventive concept’”—i.e., an element or combination of 
                                                 
 49. See, e.g., id. at 607 (explaining that 35 U.S.C. § 100(b)’s definition of 
“process” includes any “method” and that 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2006) explicitly refers to 
“method[s] of doing or conducting business”). 
 50. Id. at 604-05. 
 51. Id. at 606 (“[T]he Court today is not commenting on the patentability of 
any particular invention, let alone holding that any of the above-mentioned 
technologies from the Information Age should or should not receive patent protection. 
This Age puts the possibility of innovation in the hands of more people and raises new 
difficulties for the patent law.”). 
 52. Id. at 643-44 (“Although it may be difficult to define with precision what 
is a patentable ‘process’ under § 101, the historical clues converge on one conclusion: 
A business method is not a ‘process.’”). 
 53. See id. at 604-05. 
 54. See generally Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
 55. See id. at 2352-53. 
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elements that is “sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to 
significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.”56 
Under this test, the intermediated settlement methods failed.57  
For step one, the Court found the claims closely analogous to 
those in Bilski and deemed intermediated settlement to be an abstract 
idea because, like hedging risk, it is a “fundamental economic practice 
long prevalent in our system of commerce.”58 For step two, the Court 
emphasized that although a number of computers and computer 
activities were recited in the claims for purposes of creating and 
manipulating “shadow accounts” before completing an exchange 
transaction, “if a patent’s recitation of a computer amounts to a mere 
instruction to ‘implemen[t]’ an abstract idea ‘on . . . a computer,’ that 
addition cannot impart patent eligibility.”59 The steps in these claims 
did not go far enough and were each viewed as “purely 
conventional”:60 
Using a computer to create and maintain “shadow” accounts amounts to 
electronic recordkeeping—one of the most basic functions of a 
computer. . . . The same is true with respect to the use of a computer to 
obtain data, adjust account balances, and issue automated instructions; all 
of these computer functions are “well-understood, routine, conventional 
activit[ies]” previously known to the industry. In short, each step does no 
more than require a generic computer to perform generic computer 
functions. Considered “as an ordered combination,” the computer 
components of petitioner’s method “ad[d] nothing . . . that is not already 
present when the steps are considered separately.” Viewed as a whole, 
petitioner’s method claims simply recite the concept of intermediated 
settlement as performed by a generic computer.61 
Alice thus suggested that if one is only using a computer to perform 
functions that computers have conventionally done (e.g., storing data, 
processing data, transmitting data, etc.), claiming those functions will 
not recite a patent-eligible inventive concept.62 
                                                 
 56. Id. at 2355 (citations omitted). 
 57. See id. at 2357. 
 58. Id. at 2356.  
 59. Id. at 2358 (citations omitted). 
 60. Id.  
 61. Id. at 2359. 
 62. Although the claims in Alice were characterized as business methods and 
not software, and the word “software” appears nowhere in the Court’s opinion, 
commentators immediately recognized that software patents were now going to be 
strictly scrutinized under § 101 per Alice. See, e.g., Gene Quinn, The Ramifications of 
Alice: A Conversation with Mark Lemley, IPWATCHDOG (Sept. 4, 2014), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/09/04/the-ramifications-of-alice-a-conversation-
with-mark-lemley/id=51023/ [https://perma.cc/BC5P-FWHT]. Mark Lemley noted: 
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Indeed, after Alice, two things became clear: (1) almost every 
computerized business method claim challenged under § 101 can 
easily be distilled down to an abstract-idea “gist” under Alice step 
one;63 and (2) most computer activities recited in such claims are fairly 
characterized as “conventional” under Alice step two.64 Since Alice 
came down in June 2014, there have been very few opinions from the 
Federal Circuit that have upheld a computer-implemented method as 
patent-eligible. As of August 2017, after Alice there have been only 
eight out of 104 Federal Circuit § 101 decisions that have found the 
claims patent-eligible.65 Those decisions have generally reinforced the 
notion that one must improve computing technology to recite a patent-
eligible computerized method.66  
                                                 
I’ve heard a lot of folks talk about how Alice doesn’t really use the word 
“software” so it doesn’t really change anything, but I honestly think that’s 
wishful thinking. . . . [A] majority of the software patents being litigated 
right now, I think, are invalid under Alice. . . . The Court seems to think 
if I’ve actually got improvements in the operation of the computer itself, 
if I have a claim that is to an improved computer program or way of 
programming, maybe that’s patentable. 
Id. 
 63. See, e.g., OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362 
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (noting it as “offer-based price optimization”); Versata Dev. Group, 
Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (labeling this as 
“determining a price”); BuySafe, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 
2014) (referencing this as “creating a contractual relationship”). 
 64. See, e.g., OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at 1363 (“[C]laim 1 recites ‘sending a first 
set of electronic messages over a network to devices,’ the devices being ‘programmed 
to communicate,’ storing test results in a ‘machine-readable medium,’ and ‘using a 
computerized system . . . to automatically determine’ an estimated outcome and 
setting a price. Just as in Alice, ‘all of these computer functions are well-understood, 
routine, conventional activit[ies] previously known to the industry.”); Versata, 793 
F.3d at 1334 (“[T]he limitations of claim 17 involve arranging a hierarchy of 
organizational and product groups, storing pricing information, retrieving applicable 
pricing information, sorting pricing information, eliminating less restrictive pricing 
information, and determining the price. All of these limitations are well-understood, 
routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry.”); BuySafe, 65 F.3d 
at 1355 (“The computer functionality is generic—indeed, quite limited: a computer 
receives a request for a guarantee and transmits an offer of guarantee in return. There 
is no further detail. That a computer receives and sends the information over a 
network—with no further specification—is not even arguably inventive.”). 
 65. Gugliuzza & Lemley, supra note 12; accord Robert R. Sachs, AliceStorm 
Update February 2017, BILSKIBLOG (Mar. 16, 2017), 
http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2017/03/alicestorm-update-february-2017.html 
[https://perma.cc/UUE6-RVD3] (providing similar statistics). 
 66. See Gugliuzza & Lemley, supra note 12, at 13 (“Notably, to satisfy the 
patentable subject matter requirement, the patent must be directed to the specific 
technological improvements themselves.”). 
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In DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., for example, the 
claimed method involved dynamically generating externally linked 
webpages to mimic the look and feel of a host webpage.67 This process 
would allow a visitor to a host site to believe that a third-party 
vendor’s external webpage is associated with the host site, which 
would help retain the visitor’s attention on the linked page.68 The 
Federal Circuit deemed this invention patent-eligible because it 
“solve[d] a problem faced by websites on the Internet”; accordingly, 
“the claims recite an invention that is not merely the routine or 
conventional use of the Internet.”69 The Federal Circuit emphasized 
that “the claimed solution is necessarily rooted in computer 
technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the 
realm of computer networks.”70 In Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., the 
patented method involved a logical model for a computer database.71 
The patented data model was described as “self-referential” in that it 
utilized a single table of data, which provided for faster searching, 
more effective data storage, and more configuration flexibility 
compared to conventional “relational” data models involving multiple 
related tables.72 The Federal Circuit held this invention patent-eligible, 
finding that the claims were not directed to an abstract idea because 
“the plain focus of the claims [was] on an improvement to computer 
functionality itself, not on economic or other tasks for which a 
computer is used in its ordinary capacity.”73 Put another way, the 
claims were deemed patent-eligible because they were “directed to a 
specific improvement to the way computers operate.”74 
One’s invention need not improve a computer per se, however. 
Subsequent decisions clarified that using existing computer 
components in new, unconventional ways is also an improvement to 
computing technology that can weigh in favor of patent eligibility.75 
In BASCOM Global Internet Services Inc. v. AT&T Mobility 
LLC, for example, the Federal Circuit upheld the patent eligibility of 
                                                 
 67. DDR Holdings, L.L.C. v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1248-49 
(Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 68. Id. at 1248. 
 69. Id. at 1259. 
 70. Id. at 1257. 
 71. Enfish, L.L.C. v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 72. Id. at 1330-32. 
 73. Id. at 1336. 
 74. Id.  
 75. See BASCOM Global Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility L.L.C., 827 
F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
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a method for filtering Internet content on an individual user basis.76 
The filtering was accomplished via user accounts that selected 
customized filter schemes that are applied but not dictated by the ISP.77 
This was as opposed to having the end user install and control the 
filtering mechanism on the user’s own computer, or have the ISP 
control all filtering, as was done in the prior art.78 The inventors 
essentially used existing Internet technology (personal computers, 
user accounts, ISP servers) in a new and improved way. The court, 
while finding the claims directed to the abstract idea of filtering 
content on the Internet, explained that the inventive concept inquiry 
“requires more than recognizing that each claim element, by itself, was 
known in the art. As is the case here, an inventive concept can be found 
in the non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of known, 
conventional pieces.”79 Although “[f]iltering content on the Internet 
was already a known concept, [] the patent describes how its particular 
arrangement of elements is a technical improvement over prior art 
ways of filtering such content.”80 
Similarly, in Amdocs (Isr.) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., the 
Federal Circuit deemed patent eligible methods relating to accounting 
and billing by network service providers, involving network devices 
(e.g., servers) “arrayed in a distributed architecture that minimizes the 
impact on network and system resources.”81 Essentially, the 
distributed architecture allowed for data to reside closer to the 
information sources, which reduced network bottlenecks.82 As in 
BASCOM, the court again clarified that using “arguably generic 
components” such as servers did not defeat patent eligibility in that 
case because the “generic components operate in an unconventional 
manner to achieve an improvement in computer functionality.”83 
                                                 
 76. Id. at 1344-45, 1352. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 1350. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Amdocs (Isr.) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1291-92 
(Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 82. Id. at 1292. 
 83. Id. at 1300-01 (“In other words, this claim entails an unconventional 
technological solution (enhancing data in a distributed fashion) to a technological 
problem (massive record flows which previously required massive databases). The 
solution requires arguably generic components, including network devices and 
‘gatherers’ which ‘gather’ information. However, the claim’s enhancing limitation 
necessarily requires that these generic components operate in an 
unconventional manner to achieve an improvement in computer functionality.”). 
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The prevailing Federal Circuit view of the law places computer-
implemented business methods at a distinct disadvantage compared to 
other computerized processes. In much of the field, the focus of the 
invention may be on improving the computer technology itself, as 
opposed to the creative use of that existing technology for a different 
business objective. But limiting patentable subject matter for 
computerized methods to those that improve the capabilities of 
computing technology cannot be squared with new or old Supreme 
Court precedent on the subject, as the following Subsection shows. 
2. Doctrinal Tension in the Post-Alice Landscape 
The Federal Circuit’s view that one must improve computing 
technology to create patent-eligible computer-implemented methods 
is doctrinally problematic. The Supreme Court has never gone that far 
and has reversed the Federal Circuit several times in recent years for 
the creation of similar bright-line rules.84 Both recent and older 
Supreme Court precedent would allow the patenting of methods that 
use computers to improve a field without improving computing 
technology per se. 
Looking strictly at the Supreme Court’s opinions, whether a 
claimed computer system or process is “well-known, routine, and 
conventional” depends largely on the usage of those computer 
components or processes in the industry that is the subject of the patent 
at issue—not in the computer industry or another industry. Mayo, for 
example, explained that reciting “well-understood, routine, 
conventional activity previously engaged in by [those] in the field” 
cannot demonstrate an inventive concept.85 Alice similarly found that 
there was no inventive concept for “computer functions [that] are 
‘well-understood, routine, conventional activit[ies]’ previously known 
to the industry.”86 Indeed, in Alice the Court noted that improving 
                                                 
 84. See, e.g., Octane Fitness, L.L.C. v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. 
Ct. 1749, 1756 (2014) (rejecting “inflexible framework” for shifting of attorneys’ 
fees); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 604 (2010) (rejecting machine-or-
transformation as the “sole” test for patent-eligibility); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 
550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007) (rejecting teaching, suggestion, or motivation test as unduly 
“rigid approach” for obviousness analysis); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 
U.S. 388, 392-93 (2006) (rejecting presumption of injunctive relief upon finding of 
infringement in favor of “traditional equitable” analysis). 
 85. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs. Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72-73 
(2012) (emphasis added). 
 86. Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2359 (2014) (quoting 
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72-73) (emphasis added). 
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computer technology was only one way an inventive concept could be 
demonstrated in a computer-implemented invention: One could 
“purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself . . . [or] 
effect an improvement in any other technology or technical field.”87 
This suggests that using computer technology in conventional ways 
should be patent-eligible under Alice if the use improves some other 
technology or field or if the use of the claimed technology did not 
conventionally occur in that field.  
The Court has long recognized the difference between using 
existing technology as a building block for one’s invention and 
patenting the fundamental building blocks of technology per se.88 The 
former—combining known concepts and technologies to perform a 
new process—may be patent-eligible, particularly when considering 
the steps as an “ordered combination” under Alice.89 The novelty of 
the steps and components used in the method is not supposed to have 
any relevance to the question of patent eligibility, as “a new 
combination of steps in a process may be patentable even though all 
the constituents of the combination were well known and in common 
use before the combination was made.”90  
Diamond v. Diehr, a 1981 case that has been reaffirmed and cited 
approvingly in Bilski, Mayo, and Alice,91 is instructive and confirms 
that one can use, but not reinvent, a computer and still cross the § 101 
threshold. In Diehr, the claimed invention utilized an existing 
computer to perform calculations under a “well-known mathematical 
                                                 
 87. See id. (emphasis added). 
 88. See id. at 2354 (“At some level, ‘all inventions . . . embody, use, reflect, 
rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.’ Thus, an 
invention is not rendered ineligible for patent simply because it involves an abstract 
concept.”) (citations omitted); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981) (“It is 
inappropriate to dissect the claims into old and new elements and then to ignore the 
presence of the old elements in the analysis. This is particularly true in a process claim 
because a new combination of steps in a process may be patentable even though all 
the constituents of the combination were well known and in common use before the 
combination was made.”). Cf. KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 418-19 (“[I]nventions in 
most, if not all, instances rely upon building blocks long since uncovered, and claimed 
discoveries almost of necessity will be combinations of what, in some sense, is already 
known.”). 
 89. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 75-81. 
 90. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188-89 (“The ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a 
process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the 
subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable 
subject matter.”); see also Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354. 
 91. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358; Mayo, 566 U.S. at 66-67; Bilski v. Kappos, 561 
U.S. 593, 611 (2010). 
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equation” in connection with a process for curing rubber.92 Basically, 
the computer used the equation to make calculations that determined 
when the rubber mold should be opened to avoid over- or under-curing 
the rubber.93 To be clear, rubber could be cured just as well without a 
computer, but the use of a computer improved the reliability of the 
process.94 What Diehr had invented, in essence, was the use of a 
computer for better quality control over an existing rubber-curing 
process. Because the result was considered to be an improvement to 
the rubber-curing process, the claims were deemed a patent-eligible 
“application of a . . . mathematical formula” even though no computer 
technology per se was improved by the invention, and even though the 
computer improved the consistency of the curing process, not the 
technical capability of rubber curing.95  
The Court in Alice later explained that “the claims in Diehr were 
patent eligible because they improved an existing technological 
process, not because they were implemented on a computer.”96 Yet 
under Enfish the claims in Diehr might be viewed as merely 
accomplishing “tasks for which a computer is used in its ordinary 
capacity”—namely, making calculations based on inputs.97 And under 
DDR the claims in Diehr might similarly be viewed as “routine or 
conventional use of the [computer],” rather than solving a problem 
“necessarily rooted in computer technology.”98  
While the process in Diehr was industrial rubber molding, not a 
business method, the key to patent-eligibility in Diehr was the fact that 
the computer-implemented steps had been applied to improve a non-
computer field.99 The four corners of Alice support that understanding. 
Indeed, Diehr distinguished cases such as Gottschalk v. Benson,100 
where the claims merely recited a computer calculation for converting 
                                                 
 92. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. (“[O]ne does not need a ‘computer’ to cure natural or synthetic rubber, 
but if the computer use incorporated in the process patent significantly lessens the 
possibility of ‘overcuring’ or ‘undercuring.’”). 
 95. Id. at 187-88 (emphasis in original). 
 96. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358. 
 97. Enfish, L.L.C. v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 98. DDR Holdings, L.L.C. v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257, 1259 
(Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 99. 450 U.S. at 187-88 (deeming invention a patent-eligible “application of 
a . . . mathematical formula”). 
 100. Id. at 185 (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). 
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binary-coded decimal numbers to pure binary format.101 Cases like 
Benson were considered patent-ineligible because “[t]he sole practical 
application of the algorithm was in connection with the programming 
of a general purpose digital computer.”102 
Diehr, by contrast, had the computer involved in a non-computer 
task and limited to a particular field of application: 
In contrast [to Benson], the respondents here do not seek to patent a 
mathematical formula. Instead, they seek patent protection for a process of 
curing synthetic rubber. Their process admittedly employs a well-known 
mathematical equation, but they do not seek to pre-empt the use of that 
equation. Rather, they seek only to foreclose from others the use of that 
equation in conjunction with all of the other steps in their claimed 
process.103 
Thus, under Diehr, making calculations for an unspecified purpose 
may not be patent-eligible, but incorporating such computer functions 
into another broader process may be patent-eligible.  
Much of the precedential value of Diehr has been overshadowed 
by Alice’s progeny such that inventions analogous to that in Diehr (in 
that they are using existing computer technology to improve another 
industrial field) are nonetheless held ineligible.104 Even computerized 
business method claims typically at least recite the computer functions 
as fulfilling a specific objective outside the computer calculation.105 
                                                 
 101. Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 68 (“Here the ‘process’ claim is so abstract and 
sweeping as to cover both known and unknown uses of the BCD to pure binary 
conversion.”); see also Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185-86 (“In Benson, we held unpatentable 
claims for an algorithm used to convert binary code decimal numbers to equivalent 
pure binary numbers. The sole practical application of the algorithm was in connection 
with the programming of a general purpose digital computer.”). 
 102. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185-86. 
 103. Id. at 187. 
 104. See, e.g., Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 3d 
687, 689 (W.D. Tex. 2015) (holding ineligible method of using computers, a camera, 
and a network for remotely supervising and verifying sterile compounding of 
pharmaceuticals) (Note: the Author was counsel to Becton, Dickinson and Company 
in this case). See generally Certusview Techs., L.L.C. v. S&N Locating Servs., 111 
F. Supp. 3d 688 (E.D. Va. 2015) (finding ineligible computerized process for 
generating electronic record of dig area, including underground facilities, for 
excavation purposes); East Coast Sheet Metal Fabricating Corp. v. Autodesk, Inc., 
No. 12-cv-517, 2015 WL 226084 (D.N.H. Jan. 15, 2015) (deeming patent-ineligible 
computerized process for building detailed schematic and manufacturing blueprint for 
ventilation systems). 
 105. See, e.g., OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1361 
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussing the method of pricing a product for sale and 
communicating an offer involving statistical analysis from prior offers); Planet Bingo, 
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Supreme Court precedent does not fully support the Federal Circuit’s 
view of § 101 that would render such methods ineligible, but this 
extant doctrinal tension has not hindered the widespread and 
successful eligibility challenges to computer-implemented methods.  
3. Section 101 as a Threshold Inquiry and a Blunt Policy-
Setting Instrument 
The abstract-idea exception to § 101 is rooted in concerns about 
preemption.106 As the Court put it in Alice:  
[W]e must distinguish between patents that claim the building blocks of 
human ingenuity and those that integrate the building blocks into something 
more, thereby transforming them into a patent-eligible invention. The 
former would risk disproportionately tying up the use of the underlying 
ideas, and are therefore ineligible for patent protection. The latter pose no 
comparable risk of pre-emption, and therefore remain eligible for the 
monopoly granted under our patent laws.107 
Setting the scope of the abstract-ideas exception is a powerful tool 
with which to engineer the patent system. How this judicially created 
exception is applied in the courts plays a large part in balancing the 
patent incentive to innovate with the need to keep technological 
building blocks in the public domain.  
But patent eligibility is only a “threshold” question along the 
path to patent protection.108 Any ultimate patent protection would still 
require the claimed invention to be novel and nonobvious, as well as 
adequately described and precisely claimed.109 A claim that involves 
nothing more than computerizing conventional activities in an 
industry would likely encompass old technology or obvious uses of it 
under §§ 102–103, or perhaps would be claimed too broadly to be fully 
described or enabled under § 112.  
For these reasons, some judges and commentators have 
advocated that claims viewed as ineligibly abstract could be more 
easily disposed of via other patentability requirements where the law 
is more settled and predictable, and that courts and parties would be 
                                                 
L.L.C. v. VKGS L.L.C., 576 F. App’x 1005, 1006-07 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (noting the 
method of computer-aided management of bingo game). 
 106. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354-55 (2014). 
 107. Id. (citations, alternations, and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 108. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188 (“Arrhenius’ equation is not patentable in 
isolation, but when a process for curing rubber is devised which incorporates in it a 
more efficient solution of the equation, that process is at the very least not barred at 
the threshold by § 101.”). 
 109. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 103, 112 (2012). 
332 Michigan State Law Review  2018 
better served by avoiding a “vague and contentious” resolution on § 
101 grounds.110 TRIPS would also seem to suggest that purported 
exclusions on eligibility grounds could be addressed via other 
patentability requirements, putting eligibility and patentability on 
equal footing.111 Section 101 itself even refers to the “new” and 
“useful” requirements for patentability.112 
Others view the § 101 threshold inquiry as more jurisdictional in 
nature and find it useful for efficiently weeding out large classes of 
patents rather than taking each claim individually as per other 
patentability requirements.113 As one Federal Circuit judge explained, 
                                                 
 110. See, e.g., MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d 1250, 1261 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012) (“Following the Supreme Court’s lead, courts should avoid reaching for 
interpretations of broad provisions, such as § 101, when more specific statutes, such 
as §§ 102, 103, and 112, can decide the case.”); id. at 1261-62 (“[W]hen the question 
of abstractness is presented in its usual abstract terms, the trial court could as a matter 
of case management summarily put aside the § 101 defense on whatever grounds seem 
applicable in the case. The litigants will then be left to address the invalidity defenses 
of §§ 102, 103, and 112, as the statute provides, and the litigants, the trial court, and 
this court on review would have some semblance of a chance at arriving at a 
predictable and understandable result.”); Dennis Crouch & Robert P. Merges, 
Operating Efficiently Post-Bilski by Ordering Patent Doctrine Decision-Making, 25 
BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 1673, 1691 (2010) (“[I]t is best not to try to map the swampy 
terrain of § 101 in any great detail. Whenever possible, we argue, try something else: 
just avoid it.”); id. at 1686-87 (describing studies showing that 84–94% of claims 
rejected on § 101 grounds in the USPTO are also rejected on other grounds, which 
“show[s] an exceptionally high rate of doctrinal overlap and lends credence to the idea 
that, by initially avoiding subject-matter-eligibility questions, many of those potential 
issues will be avoided”).  
 111. See TRIPS art. 27(1) (requiring patent eligibility for “any inventions, 
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, 
involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application”) (emphasis 
added). A footnote to this provision clarifies that the European-phrased “inventive 
step” and “capable of industrial application” patentability requirements are 
“synonymous with the terms ‘non-obvious’ and ‘useful’” in U.S. law. Id. n.5. 
 112. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (stating that “whoever invents or discovers any 
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new 
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor”). 
 113. MySpace, Inc., 672 F.3d at 1264 (Mayer, J., dissenting) (citing Bilski v. 
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601 (2010) (describing statutory subject matter as a “threshold 
test”)) (stating that “[t]his court must first resolve the issue of whether the GraphOn 
patents are directed to an unpatentable ‘abstract idea’ before proceeding to consider 
subordinate issues related to obviousness and anticipation”); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 
584, 593 (1978) (stating that “‘[t]he obligation to determine what type of discovery is 
sought to be patented’ so as to determine whether it falls within the ambit of [§] 101 
‘must precede the determination of whether that discovery is, in fact, new or 
obvious’”); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Patent-Eligible Inventions After Bilski: History and 
Theory, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 53, 105-06 (2011) (arguing that using § 101 to make 
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“Addressing 35 U.S.C. § 101 at the outset not only conserves scarce 
judicial resources and spares litigants the staggering costs associated 
with discovery and protracted claim construction litigation, it also 
works to stem the tide of vexatious suits brought by the owners of 
vague and overbroad business method patents.”114 The efficiency of 
using § 101 in this manner is undeniable, but it should be counter-
balanced by the sentiment, expressed in Bilski and elsewhere, that § 
101 should be considered both broad and flexible so as not to 
prematurely exclude patent protection in new frontiers.115 
District courts have embraced the jurisdictional view and 
indicated a clear willingness to use § 101 as a blunt instrument to 
manage patent litigation. In doing so, they have found at least some of 
the challenged claims ineligible two-thirds of the time.116 And a 
considerable number of those decisions are being rendered at the 
pleadings stage of the case in response to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss or a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings.117 This 
                                                 
categorical exclusions of subject matter is doctrinally supportable, despite some 
overlap with novelty/non-obviousness, and has numerous utilitarian benefits); David 
Swetnam-Burland & Stacy O. Stitham, Patent Law 101: The Threshold Test as 
Threshing Machine, 21 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 135, 140-41 (2013) (explaining that 
“advocates of the jurisdictional view see Section 101 as the only barricade against 
invasive species that periodically threaten to overwhelm the patent 
ecosystem . . . [because §] 101 asks the Court to police the boundaries of what can 
and cannot be patented, a different enterprise with a different set of aims [than other 
doctrines of patentability]”). 
 114. OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir 
2015) (Mayer, J., concurring). 
 115. See Bilski, 563 U.S. at 607; In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 297 (Fed. Cir. 
1994) (Newman, J., dissenting) (“The nation has benefitted from the adaptability of 
the patent system to new technologies.”). 
 116. See 2015 YEAR IN REVIEW, supra note 11. 67% of all § 101 motions filed 
from the day that Alice was decided (June 19, 2014) through the end of 2015 were 
granted in whole or in part. Id. 
 117. See, e.g., Clear with Computers, L.L.C. v. Altec Indus., Inc., Nos. 6:14-
cv-79, 6:14-cv-89, 2015 WL 993392, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2015) (granting Rule 
12(b)(6) motion); Clear with Computers, L.L.C. v. Dick’s Sporting Goods, Inc., 21 F. 
Supp. 3d. 758, 769 (E.D. Tex. 2014) (granting Rule 12(c) motion); Cogent Med., Inc. 
v. Elsevier, Inc., 70 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1066 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (granting Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion); Open Text S.A. v. Alfresco Software Ltd., No. 13-cv-04843-JD, 2014 WL 
4684429, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2014) (granting Rule 12(b)(6) motion); Eclipse 
IP L.L.C. v. McKinley Equip. Corp., No. SACV 14-154-GW(AJWx), 2014 WL 
4407592, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2014) (granting Rule 12(b)(6) motion); Genetic 
Techs. Ltd. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, No. 12-1736-LPS-CJB, 2014 WL 
4379587, at *14 (D. Del. Sept. 3, 2014) (granting Rule 12(b)(6) motion); Tuxis 
Techs., L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 13-1771-RGA, 2014 WL 4382446, at *6 (D. 
Del. Sept. 3, 2014) (granting Rule 12(b)(6) motion); UbiComm, L.L.C. v. Zappos IP, 
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practice of holding patent claims ineligible at the earliest juncture of a 
patent infringement lawsuit is thus done without the benefit of 
discovery; it can be done without even construing the claims or 
considering each claim individually.118 
The Federal Circuit has very recently attempted to undermine 
this practice, holding that “[w]hether something is well-understood, 
routine, and conventional to a skilled artisan at the time of the patent 
                                                 
Inc., No. 13-1029-RGA, 2013 WL 6019203, at *6 (D. Del. Nov. 13, 2013) (granting 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion); Cardpool, Inc. v. Plastic Jungle, Inc., No. C. 12-04182-WHA, 
2013 WL 245026, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2013) (granting Rule 12(b)(6) motion); 
OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. C-12-1233-EMC, 2012 WL 3985118, at 
*20 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2012) (granting Rule 12(b)(6) motion); see also Steven 
Seidenberg, After Alice: Business-method and Software Patents May Go Through the 
Looking Glass, 101 A.B.A. J. 19 (2015), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/business_method_and_software_patent
s_may_go_through_the_looking_glass_after [https://perma.cc/7Y2V-8TTE] (“[I]n 
the wake of Alice, courts are ruling on patent eligibility earlier in the litigation process. 
Instead of waiting until summary judgment to strike down patents for ineligible 
subject matter, a number of courts have issued such rulings on motions to dismiss.”); 
Matthew Prosen, Dismissed Out of Hand: The Rise of Successful Motions to Dismiss 
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101 in the Wake of Alice, BAKER BOTTS (May 6, 2015), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/documents.lexology.com/a7d36139-8417-4d77-ba38-
512ca29a2ce4.pdf [https://perma.cc/FT2K-4J8W] (“[D]istrict courts are applying the 
Alice test to pre-claim-construction motions alleging invalidity under § 101, which 
has resulted in a rising death toll of patent claims directed to ‘abstract ideas.’ At least 
for the time being, patentees asserting claims arguably directed towards abstract ideas 
can expect to defend against pleadings-stage § 101 motions more often.”); Michael 
D. Wilburn, H. James Abe & Marsha Diedrich, Pretrial Dismissals and Judgments in 
Post-Alice Courts, LAW360 (Apr. 23, 2015, 10:22 AM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/642593/pretrial-dismissals-and-judgments-in-post-
alice-courts [https://perma.cc/PWX4-CYDC] (“In the wake of Alice . . . many courts 
are willing to grant pretrial dismissal of patent infringement cases based on patent-
ineligible subject matter. Courts have cited to Circuit Judge Haldane Robert Mayer’s 
concurrence to address the Section 101 issue ‘at the very outset’ of a case. Since Alice, 
there have been more than 60 cases that address pretrial dispositive motions based on 
patent-ineligible subject matter. In over 70 percent of those cases, the court granted 
or affirmed dismissal. Remarkably, courts granted 11 of the 15 motions to dismiss 
under Rule 12(b)(6), thus affirming invalidity at the earliest stage of litigation.”). 
 118. BuySafe, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014); 
Content Extraction & Transmission L.L.C. v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 
F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (explaining that only an “understanding of the basic 
character of the claimed subject matter” is required to resolve the legal issue of patent-
eligible subject matter); CyberFone Sys., L.L.C. v. CNN Interactive Grp., Inc., 558 F. 
App’x. 988, 991 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“There is no requirement that the district court 
engage in claim construction before deciding § 101 eligibility.”); Ultramercial, Inc. v. 
Hulu, L.L.C., 772 F.3d 709, 713, 717 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (affirming grant of “pre-answer 
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) without formally construing the claims”). 
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is a factual determination.”119 The court separately held that the patent 
specification120 and the allegations in a patentee’s civil complaint121 are 
capable of creating factual disputes that would preclude a pretrial 
judgment of ineligibility. But the court also acknowledged that “not 
every § 101 determination contains genuine disputes over the 
underlying facts material to the § 101 inquiry,” and it has yet to be 
seen whether district court practices will change.122 
Similarly, a claim construction ruling from the district court has 
been recognized as “the single most important event in the course of a 
patent litigation [because] [i]t defines the scope of the property right 
being enforced, and is often the difference between infringement and 
non-infringement, or validity and invalidity.”123 As such, the Federal 
Circuit recently explained that claims should be construed to the extent 
needed to resolve the § 101 dispute at the 12(b)(6) stage124 but left open 
the possibility that claim construction may not be required in some 
cases.125 
For these reasons, most early dispositive motions in patent cases 
would ordinarily be denied or deferred pending claim construction and 
the close of discovery. Not so for § 101 motions after Alice, at least 
thus far.  
                                                 
 119. Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018). This is not 
the first time the Federal Circuit has made this point, but it is the first time after several 
years of silence. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, L.L.C., 722 F.3d 1335, 1339 (Fed. 
Cir. 2013), vacated sub nom. WildTangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, L.L.C., 134 S. Ct. 
2870 (2014) (“This legal conclusion may contain underlying factual issues,” and 
“[a]lmost by definition, analyzing whether something was ‘conventional’ or ‘routine’ 
involves analyzing facts.”); Accenture Global Servs. v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 
F.3d 1336, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (indicating that there may be factual issues within a 
determination of patent eligibility). 
 120. Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1370 (“We only decide that on this record 
summary judgment was improper, given the fact questions created by the 
specification’s disclosure.”). 
 121. Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121 
(Fed. Cir. 2018) (“There are factual allegations in the second amended complaint, 
which when accepted as true, prevent dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).”). 
 122. Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1368.  
 123. Retractable Techs. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1370 
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (Moore, J., dissenting). 
 124. Aatrix, 882 F.3d at 1125 (“If there are claim construction disputes at 
the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, . . . the court must proceed by adopting the non-moving 
party’s constructions, or the court must resolve the disputes to whatever extent is 
needed to conduct the § 101 analysis, which may well be less than a full, formal claim 
construction.”) (citations omitted). 
 125. Id. (“The district court granted this Rule 12(b)(6) motion without claim 
construction. We have some doubt about the propriety of doing so in this case . . . .”). 
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4. Judicial Motivation 
It is not terribly surprising that judges would embrace a robust § 
101 toolbox. With busy dockets and pressure to move cases along in 
a timely fashion, a § 101 issue allows a judge to quickly dispose of 
what could otherwise be a complex and protracted lawsuit and to do 
so without investing a great deal of judicial resources on other time-
consuming preliminary matters such as claim construction and 
discovery orders. 
But are there discriminatory motivations that can be fairly 
inferred? Business method patents have long been the subject of 
skepticism because they are often broadly enforceable and usually 
associated with controversial PAE campaigns.126 Whether this 
skepticism directly or indirectly informed or influenced Alice and its 
progeny is difficult to discern because judges will rarely explain 
motivations that do not impact the legal reasoning, and the identity or 
business model of the patent owner are not proper legal considerations 
under § 101. In this Author’s research, no § 101 decision ostensibly 
turned on the status or business model of the patent owner. 
Alice may or may not have been influenced by a desire to target 
PAEs’ preferred types of patents, and the Court’s opinion makes no 
mention of such an intention. The Court did, however, receive amicus 
briefs emphasizing that PAEs tend to aggressively enforce vague 
business-method and computer-implemented process patents.127 And 
the Court has elsewhere commented about PAEs in a negative light, 
suggesting that such entities are entitled to less relief than what the 
lower courts have been giving to them.128 
                                                 
 126. See H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 54 (2011) (“A number of patent observers 
believe the issuance of poor [quality] business-method patents during the late 1990’s 
through the early 2000’s led to the patent ‘troll’ lawsuits that compelled the 
Committee to launch the patent reform project 6 years ago.”); OIP Techs., Inc. v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1364-65 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Mayer, J., concurring) 
(explaining that employing § 101 against patents early in litigation “works to stem the 
tide of vexatious suits brought by the owners of vague and overbroad business method 
patents”). 
 127. See, e.g., Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents at 4-7, Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 
2347 (2014) (No. 13-298), 2014 WL 828047; Brief for Retailers as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Neither Party at 15-16, Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 
2347 (2014) (No. 13-298), 2014 WL 295765. 
 128. See Commil USA, L.L.C. v. Cisco Sys., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1930 (2015) 
(suggesting that fee shifting under 35 U.S.C. § 285 should be employed to address the 
problem that “[s]ome companies may use patents as a sword to go after defendants 
for money, even when their claims are frivolous”); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 
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The Federal Circuit is also well aware of the PAE business 
model and recognizes that nuisance litigation should be actively 
discouraged.129 One Federal Circuit judge has noted that vague claim 
language enables the PAE business model and invites unnecessary 
claim construction disputes.130 Another Federal Circuit judge has 
expressly touted the utility of § 101 to combat PAEs’ lawsuits, noting 
that early § 101 dispositions “work[] to stem the tide of vexatious suits 
brought by the owners of vague and overbroad business method 
patents.”131  
It is possible that a desire to stem the tide of abusive patent 
lawsuits, especially those involving business method patents, is a 
motivating factor for why the § 101 jurisprudence has evolved and 
been applied the way it has. But there is little objective evidence in the 
law to infer such a motivation, and the motivation may only be 
                                                 
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396-97 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“An industry has 
developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods 
but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees. For these firms, an injunction, and 
the potentially serious sanctions arising from its violation, can be employed as a 
bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy licenses to 
practice the patent. When the patented invention is but a small component of the 
product the companies seek to produce and the threat of an injunction is employed 
simply for undue leverage in negotiations, legal damages may well be sufficient to 
compensate for the infringement and an injunction may not serve the public interest. 
In addition injunctive relief may have different consequences for the burgeoning 
number of patents over business methods, which were not of much economic and legal 
significance in earlier times. The potential vagueness and suspect validity of some of 
these patents may affect the calculus under the four-factor test.”). 
 129. See, e.g., SFA Sys., L.L.C. v. Newegg Inc., 793 F.3d 1344, 1350 (Fed. 
Cir. 2015) (explaining that “a pattern of litigation abuses characterized by the repeated 
filing of patent infringement actions for the sole purpose of forcing settlements, with 
no intention of testing the merits of one’s claims, is relevant to a district court’s 
exceptional case determination under § 285”); Eon-Net L.P. v. Flagstar Bancorp, 653 
F.3d 1314, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (noting that “[h]ere, the district court did not clearly 
err when it found that Eon-Net filed an objectively baseless infringement action 
against Flagstar and brought that action in bad faith, specifically to extract a nuisance 
value settlement by exploiting the high cost imposed on Flagstar to defend against 
Eon-Net’s baseless claims”). 
 130. In re Packard, 751 F.3d 1307, 1324-25 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Plager, J., 
concurring) (positing that “unnecessary incoherence and ambiguity in claim 
constructions should be disapproved [because] . . . they waste scarce judicial resources 
on claim construction cases that should never have been necessary to litigate, 
supporting and encouraging the kinds of litigation that have made ‘patent trolls’ dirty 
words”). 
 131. OIP Techs. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
(Mayer, J., concurring). 
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influenced by a handful of personal, privately held beliefs of 
individual judges.  
5. De Jure or De Facto Discrimination? 
Whatever the motivation, § 101 decisions are invalidating 
computerized method claims well above historical average invalidity 
rates—and earlier and with less evidentiary rigor than would 
ordinarily apply. The law is arguably neutral in terms of subject matter 
because it creates no categorical rules against patenting business 
methods, computerized or otherwise—at least some software and 
business methods are still patentable.132 But the practical effect of the 
law has been to aggressively invalidate patent claims that use 
computers for some beneficial purpose, but do not improve computer 
technology per se, even though this view is in considerable tension 
with both new and old Supreme Court precedent. There is a special, 
uniquely high bar for patenting computerized business methods in the 
U.S.  
If one reads Alice and its progeny as field neutral because the 
law does not expressly deem any categories of subject matter 
ineligible, the law is likely not de jure discriminatory. In that event, 
even evidence of discriminatory purpose to prevent the patenting of 
computer-implemented business methods would likely fail to establish 
de jure discrimination.133 Canadian Pharmaceuticals, the sole decision 
from the WTO Dispute Settlement Body involving TRIPS Article 
27,134 is instructive. There, a Canadian law allowed generic drug 
manufacturers to avoid infringement liability if their making, using, or 
selling of a patented drug was for purposes of securing regulatory 
                                                 
 132. See Fusco, supra note 10, at 133 (explaining that “technically[,] software 
and business methods are patent eligible in the U.S., but, in practice, the level of 
protection that they now enjoy is much lower than it used to be and possibly lower 
than what is provided to inventions in other fields”); infra Part II.A. 
 133. Canadian Pharmaceuticals, supra note 46, at 172. 
 134. Id. at ii. Although two other matters concerning TRIPS Article 27(1) have 
been raised in the WTO dispute resolution body, both were resolved without 
intervention by the WTO Appellate Body. See World Trade Organization, European 
Communities - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical 
Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS153/1, 1 (1998) (stating that it was in consultations on 
December 2, 1998); World Trade Organization, Brazil - Measures Affecting Patent 
Protection, WTO Doc. WT/DS199/4, 1-2 (2001) (stating that there was a mutually 
agreed solution July 19, 2001). 
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approval.135 The law did not specifically mention pharmaceuticals but 
referred generally to any “patented invention,” “product,” or “article” 
subject to government regulation.136 Although the legislative history 
of the regulations made clear that the provisions were intended to 
apply specifically to pharmaceuticals, and under Canadian law this 
legislative history was argued to effectively limit the regulations to 
that context,137 this was deemed insufficient to show de jure 
discrimination.138 
But Alice and its progeny are not really field neutral like the 
challenged law in Canadian Pharmaceuticals. Alice expressly deems 
what it calls “generic computer implementation” of a business method 
to be patent-ineligible,139 and subsequent case law explained that 
claims are patent-eligible if they “focus . . . on an improvement to 
computer functionality itself, not on economic or other tasks for which 
a computer is used in its ordinary capacity.”140 This law is applicable 
only to computer-implemented business methods and software, which 
constitutes de jure discrimination. 
Even if de jure discrimination is lacking, the evidence of de facto 
discrimination is also much stronger here than in Canadian 
Pharmaceuticals. Here there is “systemic information on the range of 
industries [affected]” to show that the new law “‘in effect’ applie[s] 
only to [computer-implemented business method and software 
patents].”141 According to one thorough study of patent application 
                                                 
 135. Canadian Pharmaceuticals, supra note 46, at 2 (providing in Section 
55.2(1) of the Canadian Patent Act that “[i]t is not an infringement of a patent for any 
person to make, construct, use or sell the patented invention solely for uses reasonably 
related to the development and submission of information required under any law of 
Canada, a province or a country other than Canada that regulates the manufacture, 
construction, use or sale of any product”). 
 136. Id. at 172. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. (noting that “[a]bsent other evidence, the words of the statute 
compelled the Panel to accept Canada’s assurance that the exception was legally 
available to every product that was subject to marketing approval requirements”). 
 139. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2352 (2014). 
 140. Enfish, L.L.C. v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 141. Canadian Pharmaceuticals, supra note 46, at 173. Although it was clear 
that pharmaceutical patents were the focus of the regulation at issue, and the WTO 
panel understood that enhancing pharmaceutical competition was the “primary 
reason” for the law, it emphasized that “preoccupation with the effects of a statute in 
one area does not necessarily mean that the provisions applicable to other areas are a 
sham, or of no actual or potential importance.” Id. 
Individual problems are frequently the driving force behind legislative 
actions of broader scope. The broader scope of the measure usually reflects 
an important legal principle that rules being applied in the area of primary 
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filings, “While Alice rejections can be found all over the USPTO, 
roughly two-thirds of them are found in [Technology Center] 3600 . . 
. the home of art units covering business methods,” with almost all of 
those rejections appearing in “e-commerce art units.”142 Other 
technology centers making up the remainder of the Alice rejection pool 
mostly involve computer networks, communications, electrical 
systems, and software.143 Alice had no appreciable effect on subject 
matter eligibility rejections in “technology centers such as 
semiconductors and mechanical engineering,” where there were 
“essentially low and constant rejection rates” on § 101 grounds of 
around 2–3% both before and after Alice.144  
Likewise, in the courts the overwhelming majority of Alice’s 
effects are felt by business methods, software, and other computer-
implemented processes, as the following chart illustrates:145 
 
                                                 
interest should also be applied to other areas where the same problem 
occurs. Indeed, it is a common desideratum in many legal systems that 
legislation apply its underlying principles as broadly as possible. So long as 
the broader application is not a sham, the legislation cannot be considered 
discriminatory. 
Id. 
 142. James Cosgrove, The Most Likely Art Units for Alice Rejections, 
IPWATCHDOG (Dec. 14, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/12/14/the-most-
likely-art-units-for-alice-rejections/ [https://perma.cc/8JVV-ZPVY] (noting that the 
allowance rate of claims in those art units dropped from “79.8% before Alice to 44.7% 
since Alice”); see also Robert R. Sachs, The One Year Anniversary: The Aftermath of 
#AliceStorm, CPIP (June 27, 2015), http://cpip.gmu.edu/2015/06/27/ 
the-one-year-anniversary-the-aftermath-of-alicestorm/ [https://perma.cc/2YHF-
NL52] (showing that § 101 rejections spiked in e-commerce art units after Alice). 
 143. See Sachs, supra note 142. 
 144. Id. This makes sense because such highly physical and concrete subject 
matter is not likely to be abstract. 
 145. See Robert R. Sachs, AliceStorm Update February 2017, BILSKI BLOG 
(Mar. 16, 2017), http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2017/03/alicestorm-update-
february-2017.html [https://perma.cc/97VH-ARC4]. 
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Much of the foregoing statistical data and Federal Circuit 
precedent post-dated the research conducted by Stefania Fusco, 
discussed above.146 The lack of data, combined with the minimal WTO 
precedent on the issue, caused Fusco to conclude that there was “not 
enough information to conclude that these decisions constitute a 
violation of the U.S. obligations under TRIPS.”147 But, with the more 
recent precedent and data in hand, the case for de facto discrimination 
is quite strong.  
                                                 
 146. Fusco’s article was originally published in September 2015, just over a 
year after Alice. The final version still calls for pre- and post-Alice statistics to fill out 
the discussion. Fusco, supra note 10, at 156 (“[W]hen the outcome of [Canadian 
Pharmaceuticals] is translated into the context of a possible §101 challenge, it 
becomes evident that a WTO panel would not only consider that technically, the Mayo 
two-step test operates in all the fields of technology, but it would also investigate 
whether in practice the Alice standard imposes the absence of or reduced protection 
primarily for software and business methods and, as previously noted, medical 
diagnostics. Specifically, data gathered from before and after Alice on the software 
and business methods patent applications submitted, the patents issued and the 
enforcement actions would be analyzed. Moreover, comparisons with other fields of 
technology would be made; the relevance of the Alice and Bilski aftermath becomes, 
at this point, axiomatic.”). 
 147. Id. at 158; id. at 155 (“[A]dditional WTO decisions on TRIPS Article 
27(1) appear to be necessary to fully address the issue of de facto discrimination and, 
more importantly, for the purpose of this article, to define its relevance in the context 
of the Mayo two-step test.”). 
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Finally, Fusco did not consider the CBM program alongside the 
judicial developments. The following Section shows how the CBM 
program considerably bolsters the argument that the U.S. 
discriminates against computer-implemented business methods. 
B. Legislative Discrimination 
The 2011 Leahy–Smith America Invents Act (AIA)148 created 
three new proceedings by which issued patents may be challenged and 
invalidated at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. These 
proceedings are called inter partes review (IPR),149 post-grant review 
(PGR),150 and covered business method review (CBM).151 Although 
the basic procedures are largely the same among the proceedings,152 
some substantive aspects differ. For example, PGR proceedings can 
only be instituted for recent patents that have an effective filing date 
post-AIA, but IPR and CBM proceedings are available for patents 
filed at any time.153 IPR proceedings may be brought only on certain 
prior art grounds,154 but CBM and PGR review are available for any 
ground of patentability, including § 101.155 While IPR and PGR 
proceedings are made available indefinitely, the CBM program is 
“transitional” in that it sunsets eight years after it went into effect (on 
September 16, 2020).156 Unlike in IPR and PGR, where any person can 
                                                 
 148. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, §§ 16-18, 
125 Stat. 284, 299, 306, 329 (2011). 
 149. See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 311-319 (2012). 
 150. See generally id. §§ 321-329. 
 151. See generally AIA § 18. As a temporary proceeding, the AIA § 18 
provisions for CBM proceedings were not codified in the U.S. Code. See Versata Dev. 
Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1310 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 152. See generally Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756 
(Aug. 14, 2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42). 
 153. Changes to Implement Post-Grant Review Proceedings, 77 Fed. Reg. 
7,060, 7,063 (Feb. 10, 2012) (“[T]he post-grant review provisions will apply to patents 
issued from applications that have an effective filing date on or after March 16, 2013, 
eighteen months after the date of enactment.”). 
 154. § 311(b) (“A petitioner in an inter partes review may request to cancel as 
unpatentable 1 or more claims of a patent only on a ground that could be raised under 
[§] 102 or 103 and only on the basis of prior art consisting of patents or printed 
publications.”). 
 155. See AIA § 18(a)(1)(A) (incorporating standard of § 321(b) pertaining to 
post-grant review proceedings). 
 156. Id. § 18(a)(3)(A) (“This subsection, and the regulations issued under this 
subsection, are repealed effective upon the expiration of the 8-year period beginning 
on the date that the regulations issued under to paragraph (1) take effect.”). 
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submit a petition, to challenge a CBM patent the challenger must have 
been sued for infringement.157 
The most glaring substantive distinction concerns the kinds of 
patents subject to each proceeding. While IPR and PGR proceedings 
are available without any discrimination as to the subject matter of the 
patent,158 the CBM program is only available for what the AIA calls 
“covered business method patents”159  
Per the statute, a “covered business method patent” is defined as 
“a patent that claims a method or corresponding apparatus for 
performing data processing or other operations used in the practice, 
administration, or management of a financial product or service.”160 
The Federal Circuit has held that this definition “is not limited to 
products and services of only the financial industry, or to patents 
owned by or directly affecting the activities of financial institutions 
such as banks and brokerage houses . . . [and] on its face covers a wide 
range of finance-related activities,” including other commercial 
practices such as determining product pricing.161 But it is not enough 
that a method relates to some potential monetary transaction because 
“[a]ll patents, at some level, relate to potential sale of a good or 
service.”162 In any case, the definition puts computerized business 
methods directly in the crosshairs. 
                                                 
 157. Id. § 18(a)(1)(B) (“A person may not file a petition for a transitional 
proceeding with respect to a covered business method patent unless the person or the 
person’s real party in interest or privy has been sued for infringement of the patent or 
has been charged with infringement under that patent.”). 
 158. See 35 U.S.C. § 311 (allowing IPR proceedings for “a patent”); id. §321 
(allowing PGR proceedings for “a patent”). 
 159. AIA § 18(a)(1)(E) (“The Director may institute a transitional proceeding 
only for a patent that is a covered business method patent.”). 
 160. Id. § 18(d)(1).  
 161. Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 
2015) 
 162. Unwired Planet, L.L.C. v. Google, Inc., 841 F.3d 1376, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 
2016). Unwired Planet also states that: 
The patent for a novel lightbulb that is found to work particularly well in 
bank vaults does not become a CBM patent because of its incidental or 
complementary use in banks. Likewise, it cannot be the case that a patent 
covering a method and corresponding apparatuses becomes a CBM patent 
because its practice could involve a potential sale of a good or service. All 
patents, at some level, relate to potential sale of a good or service. See 35 
U.S.C. § 101. Take, for example, a patent for an apparatus for digging 
ditches. Does the sale of the dirt that results from use of the ditch digger 
render the patent a CBM patent? No, because the claims of the ditch-digging 
method or apparatus are not directed to “performing data processing or other 
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Another important carve out to the AIA’s definition is that 
“patents for technological inventions” are not considered covered 
business methods.163 The associated USPTO regulation unhelpfully 
defines a “technological invention” as one that has a “technological 
feature” and “solves a technical problem using a technical solution.”164 
Considering this regulation, the Federal Circuit looked to Alice for 
guidance as to whether an invention was “technological” or merely 
utilizing a “general purpose computer to facilitate operations through 
uninventive steps.”165 According to the Federal Circuit, just as using a 
computer in a conventional way cannot recite a patent-eligible process 
under Alice, nor will it evidence sufficient “technological” character 
to save such a patent from the reach of the CBM program.166 The 
USPTO adopted essentially the same restrictive view, as its Trial 
Practice Guide indicates that inventions are not shown to be 
“technological” by: (1) the “recitation of known technologies”; (2) 
“[r]eciting the use of known prior art technology”; or (3) “[c]ombining 
prior art structures to achieve the normal, expected, or predictable 
result of that combination.”167  
While limiting the CBM program to exclude “technological” 
patents on its face might seem to pass muster as not discriminating 
based on “fields of technology,” this tie-in to Alice jurisprudence 
reveals the clear differential treatment. That view of “technology” 
deems some technology non-technological and effectively misdefines 
technological to mean inventive, as discussed above. 
Unlike the judicial developments discussed above in Part II.A, 
the motivation for the CBM program is clear. Creating a special, 
limited-time program for a targeted subset of patents was justified in 
the House Committee Report as being necessary to correct for the 
USPTO’s over-issuance of business method patents around the turn of 
the century:  
                                                 
operations” or “used in the practice, administration, or management of a 
financial product or service,” as required by the statute. AIA § 18(d). 
Id. See also Secure Axcess, L.L.C. v. PNC Bank N.A., 848 F.3d 1370, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 
2017) (finding method of webpage authentication not a covered business method and 
explaining that “just because an invention could be used by various institutions that 
include a financial institution, among others, does not mean a patent on the invention 
qualifies under the proper definition of a CBM patent”). 
 163. AIA § 18(d)(1). 
 164. 37 C.F.R. § 42.301(b) (2013).  
 165. Versata Dev. Grp., 793 F.3d at 1327. 
 166. See id. at 1332, 1334-35 
 167. Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,764 (Aug. 
14, 2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42). 
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A number of patent observers believe the issuance of poor [quality] 
business-method patents during the late 1990’s through the early 2000’s led 
to the patent “troll” lawsuits that compelled the Committee to launch the 
patent reform project 6 years ago. At the time, the USPTO lacked a 
sufficient number of examiners with expertise in the relevant art area. 
Compounding this problem, there was a dearth of available prior art to assist 
examiners as they reviewed business method applications. Critics also note 
that most countries do not grant patents for business methods.168 
Congress also held the Federal Circuit partially responsible due to its 
1998 decision in State Street Bank & Trust v. Signature Financial 
Group, Inc., which deemed patent-eligible any process with a “useful, 
concrete, and tangible result.”169 It was believed, in light of recent 
precedent such as Bilski that “sharply pulled back on the patenting of 
business methods, emphasizing that these ‘inventions’ are too abstract 
to be patentable,” that the CBM program would “reduce the burden on 
the courts of dealing with the backwash of invalid business-method 
patents.”170 All of this discriminatory motivation can be inferred from 
the objective qualities of the CBM program,171 which singles out the 
CBM subject matter for special (including “abstractness”) review but 
limits the program to actively litigated patents that are currently 
causing harm and only offers the program for a limited time to correct 
certain past mistakes. 
Although Congress included a “[r]ule of [c]onstruction” that the 
CBM statute should not be interpreted “as amending or interpreting 
categories of patent-eligible subject matter set forth under section 101 
of title 35,”172 the open hostility to business method patents suggests 
that the CBM system was intended to reflect Congress’s disapproval 
of such methods being broadly patentable.173 Congress clearly set out 
                                                 
 168. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 54 (2011). 
 169. State Street Bank & Trust v. Signature Financial Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 
1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 170. 157 CONG. REC. S1367 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
 171. Canadian Pharmaceuticals, supra note 46, at 173 (explaining that 
examining discriminatory purpose is “not an inquiry into the subjective purposes of 
the officials responsible for the measure, but an inquiry into the objective 
characteristics of the measure from which one can infer the existence or nonexistence 
of discriminatory objectives”). 
 172. AIA § 18(e). 
 173. Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: 
Part II of II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 539, 628 (2012) (“[S]ection 18 obviously reflects a 
congressional disapprobation of the patenting of business methods.”); id. n.568 (citing 
157 CONG. REC. S1053 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2011) (statement of Sen. Schumer) 
(“[D]enouncing ‘the scourge of business method patents currently plaguing the 
financial sector,’ and stating that ‘[b]usiness method patents are anathema to the 
protection the patent system provides.’”)); 157 CONG. REC. S1367 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 
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to invigorate Bilski to target “abstract business concepts and their 
implementation, whether in computers or otherwise.”174 Indeed, 
Senator Schumer’s explanation of the difference between “covered 
business methods” subject to the CBM program and “technological” 
inventions was strikingly prescient of the subsequent Alice decision: 
The technological invention exception is also not intended to exclude a 
patent simply because it recites technology. For example, the recitation of 
computer hardware, communication or computer networks, software, 
memory, computer-readable storage medium, scanners, display devices or 
databases, specialized machines, such as an ATM or point of sale device, or 
other known technologies, does not make a patent a technological invention. 
In other words, a patent is not a technological invention because it combines 
known technology in a new way to perform data processing operations.175 
Even if Congress stopped short of creating a special patent-eligibility 
rule per se, the Federal Circuit has bridged the gap and closely tied the 
permissible scope of CBM review to Alice and § 101 jurisprudence.176 
The result has been that, as Congress had clearly intended (or at least 
hoped), patent claims that reach a final judgment in the CBM program 
are being invalidated at extremely high rates—more than 80%.177 
                                                 
2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (expressing the belief that “these ‘inventions’ are too 
abstract to be patentable,” and that the CBM program has “reduce[d] the burden on 
the courts of dealing with the backwash of invalid business-method patents”). 
 174. 157 CONG. REC. S1379 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl); 
see also id. (noting that “the expectation that most if not all true business-method 
patents are abstract and therefore invalid in light of the Bilski decision”); H.R. REP. 
NO. 112-98, at 54 (2011) (“A number of patent observers believe the issuance of poor 
[quality] business-method patents during the late 1990’s through the early 2000’s led 
to the patent ‘troll’ lawsuits that compelled the Committee to launch the patent reform 
project 6 years ago.”). 
 175. 157 CONG. REC. S1364 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. 
Schumer). 
 176. Versata Dev. Grp, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 
2015) (citing Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014)) (“As 
the PTAB correctly noted, even if the invention required the use of a computer, the 
claim did not constitute a technological invention. As we are now instructed, the 
presence of a general purpose computer to facilitate operations through uninventive 
steps does not change the fundamental character of an invention.”). 
 177. Patent Trial and Appeal Board Statistics, USPTO 11 (Feb. 28, 2017), 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/aia_statistics_february2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T4AD-EMYL] (showing that 81% of all final written decisions 
result in all challenged claims being invalidated (representing 29% of total petitions), 
with another 15% of final written decisions resulting in some challenged claims being 
invalidated (representing 5% of total petitions)); see also Elliot C. Cook, Daniel F. 
Klodowski & David C. Seastrunk, Claim and Case Disposition, FINNEGAN AIA BLOG, 
http://www.aiablog.com/claim-and-case-disposition/ [https://perma.cc/Z4UB-
HZWK] (last visited Mar. 19, 2018); Philip Swain, The Remarkable Effectiveness of 
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Through the end of 2015, only 1 out of 40 CBM proceedings resolved 
on § 101 grounds was decided in favor of the patent owner.178  
But Congress did more than single out of this field of patents for 
special invalidity proceedings, expecting that most of the patents 
would be invalidated. Congress also burdened the owners of those 
patents with two unique disadvantages relating to parallel litigation.  
As substitutes for district court litigation, all the AIA 
proceedings include some estoppels to avoid duplicative litigation.179 
But those who challenge a CBM patent are significantly less restricted 
when challenging the patent on multiple fronts.180 While invalidity 
positions taken in IPR and PGR proceedings broadly preclude 
petitioners from arguing in court as to “any ground that the petitioner 
raised or reasonably could have raised during that [proceeding],”181 in 
CBM proceedings the petitioner is only estopped from rearguing those 
grounds actually raised.182 
Congress also provided a rare right to an interlocutory appeal of 
a decision on a motion to stay litigation pending the outcome of a 
CBM proceeding.183 Congress even made the standard of review for 
such an appeal de novo.184 As the Federal Circuit explained, “[P]rior 
to the AIA, district court decisions on motions to stay pending U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) proceedings were generally not 
appealable and, when they were, we reviewed them under the abuse 
of discretion standard.”185 Thus, any defendant targeted by a patent that 
is the subject of CBM proceeding now has a unique, new, and 
powerful leverage to help it obtain a stay of the parallel litigation. 
Again, these objective characteristics of the CBM program reveal 
                                                 
Alice v CLS Bank Challenges at the PTAB, PTAB BLOG (Oct. 23, 2015), 
http://www.ptab-blog.com/2015/10/23/the-remarkable-effectiveness-of-alice-v-cls-
bank-challenges-at-the-ptab/ [https://perma.cc/S3YY-UL59]. 
 178. HOWARD, supra note 19, at 5. 
 179. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(e)(2), 325(e)(2) (2012). 
 180. See AIA § 18(a)(1)(D).  
 181. 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(e)(2), 325(e)(2) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 182. See AIA § 18(a)(1)(D) (establishing a “Transitional Program for Covered 
Business Method Patents”). 
 183. Id. § 18(b)(2) (“A party may take an immediate interlocutory appeal from 
a district court’s decision [on a motion to stay].”). 
 184. Id. § 12(b)(2) (“The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit shall review the district court’s decision to ensure consistent application of 
established precedent, and such review may be de novo.”). 
 185. VirtualAgility, Inc. v. Salesforce.com, Inc., 759 F.3d 1307, 1310 (Fed. 
Cir. 2014). 
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Congress’ discriminatory purpose of weeding out patents where the 
merits of the patent enforcement actions are highly suspect. 
Although these disadvantages to owners of CBM patents were 
ostensibly intended to help curtail abusive CBM patent lawsuits 
brought by PAEs, the laws are not limited to PAEs but apply to all 
owners of CBM patents merely because of the subject matter of their 
patents. The only arguable tie to PAEs involved is the fact that a 
person cannot petition for CBM review unless that person has been 
sued or charged with infringement of the patent.186 But non-PAEs can 
and do enforce their patents as well, making the enforcement of the 
patent against the petitioner a poor proxy for being a PAE. The law, 
regardless of motivation, discriminates solely on the type of subject 
matter claimed in the patent. 
C. Discrimination Beyond Justifiable Differential Treatment 
Of course, not every law that singles out a technology area will 
violate TRIPS Article 27. Prohibiting discrimination is not the same 
thing as requiring uniformity.187 As the WTO panel in Canadian 
Pharmaceuticals put it, “Article 27 does not prohibit bona fide 
exceptions to deal with problems that may exist only in certain product 
areas.”188 The improper discrimination contemplated by Article 27(1) 
concerns “the unjustified imposition of differentially disadvantageous 
treatment.”189 Subject to Article 30, patent laws can sometimes treat 
different things differently because of their justifiable differences.190  
For example, in the United States patent terms may be extended 
for inventions such as drugs if the drugs are still undergoing regulatory 
review after the patent issues.191 Because regulatory review must be 
completed before drugs may be sold in the United States, this 
                                                 
 186. See AIA § 18(a)(1)(B). 
 187. Canadian Pharmaceuticals, supra note 46, at 105 (Comments of 
Australia) (“Lack of discrimination in relation to enjoyment of patent rights should be 
distinguished from the application of uniform rules in all areas of technology. It was 
not inconsistent with the TRIPS Agreement to provide for distinct patent rules that 
responded to practical consequences of differences between fields of technology.”). 
 188. Id. at 170-71 (noting that the concept of discrimination “certainly extends 
beyond the concept of differential treatment”). 
 189. Id. at 171. 
 190. See id. at 169.  
 191. See 35 U.S.C. § 156(c) (2012) (stating that “[t]he term of a patent eligible 
for extension under subsection (a) shall be extended by the time equal to the regulatory 
review period for the approved product which period occurs after the date the patent 
is issued,” with certain exceptions). 
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provision essentially restores to the patent owner the full patent term 
(and corresponding market exclusivity) that would otherwise be lost 
during regulatory review.192 Similarly, § 271(e), discussed below in 
Part IV, allows generics to begin their own regulatory review 
processes before the patent expires, recognizing that otherwise the 
patent owner would have an undue de facto extension of patent term.193 
Laws like these are likely acceptable under TRIPS Articles 27 and 30 
because drugs have to navigate through a thicket of regulations that 
other kinds of inventions do not.194  
These examples of different treatment for drug patents are 
justified because they reflect the actual differences in how the patent 
rights are able to be exercised.195 Because of the unique regulation of 
drugs, arguably the law would disproportionately advantage or 
disadvantage drug patent owners if it did not treat those drugs 
differently in the ways noted above.196 Such differential treatment may 
be viewed as nondiscriminatory because it was “implemented with the 
very intention of ensuring that patent rights could be enjoyed without 
discrimination,” and it effectively “ensure[s] that the basic balance of 
rights and obligations [is] maintained.”197  
                                                 
 192. See id. 
 193. See generally id. § 271(e); cf. Canadian Pharmaceuticals, supra note 46, 
at 161 (“The additional period of market exclusivity in this situation is not a natural 
or normal consequence of enforcing patent rights. It is an unintended consequence of 
the conjunction of the patent laws with product regulatory laws, where the 
combination of patent rights with the time demands of the regulatory process gives a 
greater than normal period of market exclusivity to the enforcement of certain patent 
rights.”). 
 194. Canadian Pharmaceuticals, supra note 46, at 49 n.146 (“The fact that 
eight to 12 years of the patent term were ‘lost’ because of marketing approval 
requirements constituted the ‘good reason’ to treat pharmaceutical patents more 
favourably than other patents, where marketing approval, if at all required, could be 
obtained in a much shorter period of time.”); id. at 161 (“For the vast majority of 
patented products, there is no marketing regulation of the kind covered by Section 
55.2(1), and thus there is no possibility to extend patent exclusivity by delaying the 
marketing approval process for competitors.”). 
 195. Id. at 105 (“[T]he need to respond to lengthy regulatory delays in the 
pharmaceutical domain had led to forms of term extension which were designed to 
restore the balance of interests. Similarly, limited exceptions to patent rights allowing 
generic competitors to seek regulatory approval for pharmaceuticals aimed to restore 
the balance of interests that applied immediately upon the expiry of the patent.”). 
 196. See id. As Australia argued in Canadian Pharmaceuticals, sometimes 
“undifferentiated treatment, when applied across the board, could result in 
discrimination against those that face technology-specific circumstances.” Id.  
 197. Id. Europe, the United States, and Australia all took the position in the 
Canadian Pharmaceuticals dispute that patent term extensions for drugs did not run 
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That is not what is happening in the United States with respect 
to business methods. The U.S. draws a line between using computing 
technology and creating it, calling the former non-technology when 
what it really means is non-innovative, which is beside the point. That 
discrimination does not seek to provide balance to the system, treating 
computerized business methods differently because of some inherent 
handicap that attaches to the subject matter. It appears to be a simple 
policy choice—the government does not like patenting computerized 
business methods because they seem vague and non-innovative and 
they are so often wielded by abusive PAEs.  
There are many technology-neutral ways that such problems 
with computerized business method patents can be remedied: 
enhancing examination quality across the board, promoting clearer 
claim drafting, and providing more robust tools to deter litigation 
misconduct. While these are all being done to some degree,198 the U.S. 
then goes further—too far—by making it especially hard to patent 
computerized business methods and especially easy to invalidate the 
ones that are already patented. That is not mere differential treatment 
justified by some special characteristic of the subject matter. It is 
discrimination. 
This is not to say that computerized business methods cannot be 
singled out for some special treatment. They can, but the special 
treatment must relate to and compensate for something unique to the 
subject matter. For example, if it is uniquely challenging for the 
USPTO to locate relevant prior art in the computerized business 
method space—due, e.g., to limited access to the relevant non-patent 
literature—a law requiring the preparation and submission of a 
certified prior art search by the applicant might be justified. As another 
                                                 
afoul of Article 27(1). Id. at 49 n.146 (“[T]he EC said that they shared the views 
expressed by Australia and the United States that patent term extension for 
pharmaceutical products . . . did not constitute a discrimination prohibited by Article 
27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, and that one could even argue that, under certain 
circumstances, patent term extension might be mandated by Article 27.1.”). The U.S. 
also believed that its § 271(e) exemption complied with Articles 27 and 30. See id. at 
157. 
 198. See, e.g., Patent Quality, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/patent/ 
initiatives/enhanced-patent-quality-initiative-0 [https://perma.cc/2N4Z-KE47] (last 
modified Feb. 23, 2018) (describing various efforts to improve examination practices 
and procedures); see also Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 
2130 (2014) (raising the threshold for claim definiteness and holding that “[i]t cannot 
be sufficient that a court can ascribe some meaning to a patent’s claims”); Octane 
Fitness, L.L.C. v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756 (2014) 
(adopting broad, flexible framework for shifting of attorneys’ fees). 
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example, if business methods are inherently difficult to claim with 
precision because they are often phrased in functional, outcome-
oriented terms, regulations specifying that certain types of functional 
language will require additional operational details to pass muster 
under the definiteness standard might be proper. 
But the U.S. has not employed such tailored approaches. It has 
instead made blanket discriminatory laws against computerized 
business methods. 
II. COMPUTER-IMPLEMENTED BUSINESS METHODS ARE  
FIELDS OF TECHNOLOGY 
As a member of TRIPS, the United States has agreed to make 
patent protection available for “any inventions, whether products or 
processes, in all fields of technology,” such that “patent rights [are] 
enjoyable without discrimination as to the . . . field of technology.”199 
This Part examines whether the above-described discrimination 
against computer-implemented business methods, subjecting them to 
an especially high hurdle for protection and special invalidity 
procedures, is an improper discrimination as to a “field of 
technology.” It shows that the text of TRIPS, contemporary conduct, 
historical and normative context, and good policy all favor a reading 
of “fields of technology” that includes computer-implemented 
business methods. This Part further shows that the result of a broad 
reading of “technology” need not, and does not, open the flood gates 
for excessive or overbroad business method patenting. 
A. Textual and Doctrinal Support 
To start with the text of TRIPS, the plain meaning of “fields of 
technology” would appear to include computerized business methods. 
Such phrases in treaties are presumed to have their ordinary meanings, 
both in context and considering the purpose of the treaty.200 Many 
dictionary definitions for “technology” contemplate that technology is 
not only something invented or created, but also used—e.g., “the 
branch of knowledge that deals with the creation and use of technical 
                                                 
 199. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 27(1). 
 200. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good 
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”). 
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means”;201 “the use of science in industry, engineering, etc., to invent 
useful things or to solve problems”;202 “the methods for using scientific 
discoveries for practical purposes, esp. in industry.”203 None of these 
definitions strictly requires that a field of technology involve inventing 
technology per se, as Alice, Enfish, DDR, and their progeny would 
suggest. 
Yet U.S. law essentially conflates the idea of being technological 
with the idea of improving technological tools over what already 
exists. Alice demands more than using computing technology to 
perform “well-understood, routine, conventional activit[ies].”204 
Likewise, Congress excluded “technological inventions” from the 
scope of the CBM program,205 but the Federal Circuit then tied that 
question back to Alice,206 and the USPTO will not treat inventions as 
technological if they recite the use of known technologies in 
conventional ways.207 
These efforts to distinguish technology from non-technology are 
addressing the wrong patentability concepts, however. Being known 
or understood in the prior art is the domain of § 102’s novelty 
requirement,208 not § 101, and the notion of modifications and 
combinations being ordinary or predictable is squarely within the 
territory of § 103’s obviousness requirement.209 TRIPS likewise refers 
                                                 
 201. See Technology, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/ 
technology [https://perma.cc/XHD8-55M5] (last visited Mar. 19, 2018) (emphasis 
added). 
 202. Technology, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/technology [https://perma.cc/63A2-CNZA] (last visited Mar. 
19, 2018) (emphasis added) (using the definition for “English Language Learners”). 
 203. Technology, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/ 
us/dictionary/english/technology [https://perma.cc/JKA3-CDSN] (last visited Mar. 
19, 2018) (emphasis added). 
 204. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2359 (2014). 
 205. AIA § 18(d)(1). 
 206. Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 
2015). 
 207. Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,763-64 (Aug. 
14, 2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42) (deeming the following not indicative of 
a technological invention: (1) the “recitation of known technologies”; (2) “[r]eciting 
the use of known prior art technology”; or (3) “[c]ombining prior art structures to 
achieve the normal, expected, or predictable result of that combination”). 
 208. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012) (“A person shall be entitled to a patent 
unless—(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or 
in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing 
date of the claimed invention.”). 
 209. Id. § 103. 
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to “new” inventions possessing an “inventive step” separately from 
“fields of technology” in Article 27(1),210 which plainly distinguishes 
those concepts just like U.S. law does (or should, under Diehr).211 Nor 
would it be appropriate to limit “technological” inventions to those 
deemed to possess “industrial applicability” or “utility,” as some have 
argued,212 as that patentability requirement is also separately recited in 
§ 101 and Article 27.213  
Whatever a “field of technology” is under TRIPS, it is not the 
same thing as a novel, nonobvious, or useful invention. If inventions 
are to be excluded from patent protection for being non-technological, 
it cannot be solely on such other patentability grounds. 
B. Conduct- and Context-Based Support 
Context surrounding TRIPS indicates that many computer-
implemented processes are within the scope of Article 27. Although 
business methods may not have been explicitly patentable in the U.S. 
                                                 
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that 
the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in [§] 102, if the 
differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the 
claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective 
filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the 
art to which the claimed invention pertains.  
Id. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007) (stating that in 
determining obviousness, “a court must ask whether the improvement is more than 
the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions”). 
 210. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 27(1). 
 211. Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 33 (2010).  
In interpreting statutory text, we ordinarily presume that the use of different 
words is purposeful and evinces an intention to convey a different meaning. 
See, e.g., Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23, 104 S. Ct. 296, 78 
L.Ed.2d 17 (1983) (“We refrain from concluding here that the differing 
language in the two subsections has the same meaning in each. We would 
not presume to ascribe this difference to a simple mistake in 
draftsmanship”). There is no reason we should presume otherwise in the 
context of treaties. 
Id. But see Joshua D. Sarnoff, Patent-Eligible Inventions After Bilski: History and 
Theory, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 53, 101-02 (2011) (arguing that some overlap in novelty 
and obviousness is appropriate and necessary to ensure that the subject matter is the 
kind of invention that belongs in the patent system). 
 212. Thomas, supra note 29, at 1178 (“Concise, proven, and compatible with 
the TRIPS Agreement, the industrial applicability requirement provides an apt way to 
limit the patent system to what we understand to be technological.”). 
 213. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 27, n.5 (“For the purposes of this Article, the 
terms ‘inventive step’ and ‘capable of industrial application’ may be deemed by a 
Member to be synonymous with the terms ‘non-obvious’ and ‘useful’ respectively.”). 
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when TRIPS was ratified,214 it is clear that software was.215 
Considering that one important aspect of the TRIPS negotiations was 
to secure protection for “processes” when some countries did not want 
to patent processes at all,216 a more inclusive reading of “fields of 
technology” to encompass computer-implemented processes accords 
well with the state of the law at the time. 
The United States’ conduct subsequent to TRIPS’s ratification 
also supports the view that computerized business methods are among 
the “processes” for which Article 27(1) ensures protection. TRIPS 
does not define “processes” or mention software or business methods 
expressly (though it does allow countries to exclude certain other 
processes),217 but the U.S. post-ratification has consistently acted as if 
Article 27 includes both. Specifically, WTO mechanisms allow 
TRIPS members to question the laws of new members or the new laws 
of existing members for compliance with TRIPS provisions,218 and as 
Stefania Fusco has demonstrated, on ten separate occasions the U.S. 
questioned the patent laws of another country concerning the 
availability of protection for software and/or business methods.219 
Fusco concluded that “the U.S. has consistently interpreted [] TRIPS 
Article 27(1) as requiring WTO countries to provide protection to both 
software and business methods.”220 And because the Vienna 
Convention221 deems “subsequent practice in the application of the 
treaty” as probative of the meaning of the treaty’s text, this conduct 
                                                 
 214. See Fusco, supra note 10, at 138, 146 (noting that TRIPS post-dated 
Diehr regarding software patentability but predated State Street Bank regarding 
business method patentability); accord H.R. REP. NO. 110-314, at 38-39 (2007). 
 215. See Fusco, supra note 10, at 138, 146. 
 216. See TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 27(1) (requiring patentability of inventions, 
“whether products or processes”); DANIEL C.K. CHOW & EDWARD LEE, 
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 314 
(2d ed. 2012) (“[Article 27] effectively prohibits the practice of some countries that 
had excluded pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and processes from patents.”). 
 217. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 27(1), (3) (“[P]atents shall be available for any 
inventions, whether products or processes. . . . Members may also exclude from 
patentability: (a) diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of 
humans or animals.”). 
 218. See Fusco, supra note 10, at 146-47 (discussing the author’s “exhaustive 
search of documents made available by the WTO” concerning “Review of 
Legislations, either at the time other countries became WTO members or when they 
amended their laws; the special Transitional Review Mechanism (TRM) of China; and 
Trade Policy Reviews”). 
 219. See id. at 147 (stating that Australia, Canada, and Brazil have made 
similar inquiries concerning business methods).  
 220. Id. at 150. 
 221. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 200, art. 31(2)(b). 
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suggests that the U.S. would, if challenged, have a very hard time 
arguing that TRIPS does not require the protection of at least some 
software and business methods.222  
Beyond the U.S., although the majority of TRIPS members do 
not protect business methods per se, some do.223 The importance of 
information technology in business has pressured patent offices 
abroad to bring at least some computerized business methods into the 
fold, and the line between sufficiently “technical” computerized 
methods and mere computer implementation of business practices is 
not a bright one.224 While the exact scope of computerized business 
                                                 
 222. See Fusco, supra note 10, at 150-51. 
 223. Allison & Tiller, supra note 29, at 1022 n.111 (“[M]ost other 
countries do not recognize patents on business methods.”); Rajnish Kumar Rai & 
Srinath Jagannathan, Do Business Method Patents Encourage Innovation?, 2012 B.C. 
INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 1, 5-6 (“While the U.S. grants patents to business methods 
as long as they have useful application, other countries are divided. For instance, 
Japan, Australia, Singapore and possibly Korea generally appear to follow the U.S., 
whereas the European Union (‘EU’), the United Kingdom (‘UK’), Canada and India 
are more conservative on the issue and do not favor BMPs.”); Jason Taketa, Note, The 
Future of Business Method Software Patents in the International Intellectual Property 
System, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 943, 962 (2002) (“Several countries’ patent laws, such as 
Germany’s, expressly prohibit the patenting of business methods 
and computer programs. Furthermore, the EPO has recently clarified its position that 
business methods are not of a technical nature, and therefore cannot receive patent 
protection as a process under the EPO system.”). 
 224. Rai & Jagannathan, supra note 223, at 5-6 (“[A]s the rapid development 
and diffusion of information technology resulted in a significant increase in 
importance of business methods, the [Japanese Patent Office] revised its guidelines 
for examination of computer software related inventions, and suggested that a 
business method may be patentable when claimed as a part of an invention involving 
a computer program.”); see Taketa, supra note 223, at 962-63 (explaining that “some 
processes [in Europe] may find protection, while others will not. For inventors 
deciding whether to pursue patent protection abroad for their computerized processes, 
the state of the law may still represent a legal crap shoot”); id. at 982 (“[C]omputer-
implemented business methods have announced their arrival on the international 
scene as an industrial property that is begging for protection.”). The European Union, 
for example, purports to exclude “programs for computers” and “methods for . . . 
doing business” per se from the patent system but appears to leave room for at least 
some computerized business methods that have a “technical character” to be patented. 
See Convention of the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention) art. 
52, Oct. 5, 1973, 1056 U.N.T.S. 199, 271-72; Patenting Software, WIPO, 
http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/documents/software_ 
patents_fulltext.html [https://perma.cc/J9TD-876B] (last visited Mar. 19, 2018) 
(explaining that despite the potential availability of patent protection abroad because 
of the different legal standards utilized, “it may be that certain software-related 
innovations are considered as patentable subject matter in the USA, while the same 
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method protection around the world may be somewhat unclear, what 
is clear is that the U.S. is not alone among TRIPS members in offering 
some patent protection in the field. 
C. Historical and Normative Support 
Scholars who have attempted to draw the line between 
technology and non-technology in this context have ended up with 
blurry, subjective boundaries that involve deeming something 
“technological” based on the degree of technical detail in the claims, 
the kind of improvement involved, or even whether the subject matter 
feels sufficiently like what most traditionally would consider 
technological—i.e., industrial.225 As Sean O’Connor observed, “A 
‘technological arts’ test sends us down a rabbit hole of trying to 
determine what ‘technology’ is, which is frustrated by the fact that 
popular use of this term is quite vague; ‘technology’ is some sort of 
active ‘technical’ or science-based processes and the artifacts that 
result from them.”226 
But whether something is or is not a field of technology need not 
be a fuzzy spectrum. A better inquiry would simply ask whether the 
subject matter involves inventing or using tools or technology for a 
                                                 
innovations might fall outside of the scope of patentable subject matter in Europe or 
Japan”).  
 225. See, e.g., Durham, supra note 29, at 1451, 1523 (equating “useful arts” 
with “technological arts” and concluding that because of contextual subtleties, 
“[t]here is simply no single, generally accepted definition of ‘technology’”).  
When a patent claims a software implementation of a non-technological 
plan, the validity of the claim under § 101, and under the “useful arts” clause 
of the Constitution, should depend on whether the claim includes enough 
substantive details relating to program logic or data structures that the 
invention is one within the technological art of computer programming . . . 
. If the claim, in substance, speaks in non-technological language of non-
technological concepts, it should be considered a claim to a non-
technological invention. On the other hand, if the claim speaks in the 
programmer’s language of the programmer’s art, then the claim should be 
considered one to a “useful art.” Often the line may be difficult to draw.  
Id.; Thomas, supra note 29, at 1185 (“Our patent law should comport with our 
perception of what technology is, not defy it. Restoring a patentability standard firmly 
grounded in industrial applicability, rather than equating technology with anything 
artificial, would enable us to maintain the integrity of our current patent system. 
Moreover, it would enable us to respect the boundary between the whole expression 
of our humanity and that small part of it that is properly called technological.”). 
 226. Sean M. O’Connor, The Lost “Art” of the Patent System, 2015 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1397, 1474. 
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practical purpose. This view is consistent with the historical scope of 
the “useful arts” that have long been the domain of patent systems.227  
In an excellent article tracing the history of various “arts” from 
antiquity through the present, Sean O’Connor explains that early 
patent systems both before and after the Scientific Revolution did not 
require that a patentable advancement be rooted in science or 
technology.228 Rather, patents were consistently available to 
advancements in the “useful arts.”229 “[I]t took until well into the 
twentieth century for ‘technology’ to even begin to displace ‘art’ in 
cases and commentary.”230 That substitution of terminology, 
O’Conner argues, was unfortunate because definitions of technology 
tend to be vague231 or formalistic in ways that exclude what is clearly 
patentable subject matter.232  
Inventors and invention are typically associated with STEM 
fields, but O’Connor argues that “‘technology’ is, in its proper usages, 
a descriptor of approaches to artisanal fields and problem-solving, it 
is not really about the subject matter of anything, much less that of 
patentable inventions.”233 Linking “science” with patentable subject 
matter is even more problematic from O’Connor’s perspective, as it 
                                                 
 227. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power “[t]o 
promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors 
the exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries”). See generally O’Connor, supra note 
226. 
 228. See O’Connor, supra note 226, at 1470-73. 
 229. Id. at 1473 (“Famous eighteenth and nineteenth century science-based 
patented inventions, and cases arising from them, receive the most attention from 
historians of science, technology, and law (respectively); but that does not mean the 
patent systems of the times were limited to such inventions. Further, even with the 
interest in science-based inventions at the time—as suggested by nineteenth century 
patent treatise writers—the language of patents was still very much that of ‘arts.’”). 
 230. Id. at 1473-74. 
 231. See id. at 1474 (discussing the ambiguity of a “technological arts” test); 
id. at 1469 (“[W]e are stuck in an age where ‘technology’ has supplanted ‘art’ for 
essentially all human manipulations of natural materials and forces except those we 
somehow intuit are works of fine art.”). 
 232. See id. at 1474-75 (stating that “[t]he only way to get rigorous about the 
scope of ‘technology’ is to limit it back to one of the formal definitions such as the 
applied science or systematic study of techné fields senses. But this would 
unnecessarily exclude many valuable traditional (and current) patent eligible 
inventions such as the proverbial better mousetrap.”). 
 233. See id. at 1475 (emphasis added) (concluding that “there is not great value 
in distinguishing inventors who take a ‘technological’ approach from those who take 
any other sort of productive approach”).  
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arguably encourages patenting scientific principles, natural 
phenomena, and abstract ideas.234 
O’Connor therefore advocates for a return to a focus on “art,” 
not technology or science, and specifically the “useful arts” that the 
U.S. Constitution explicitly seeks to promote.235 Under O’Connor’s 
thoroughly supported definition, “useful arts” would include any and 
all arts that involve the “use of natural materials or forces for practical 
(useful) ends.”236 The key distinction is that between: (1) “practical” 
applications that can be measured or compared as somehow 
objectively or quantifiably better, stronger, faster, cheaper, etc.; and 
(2) fields like the fine arts, where the value or contribution is 
subjective and comes down to “purely taste or sentiment.”237 As so 
understood, this definition of “useful arts” would easily encompass 
computerized business methods, which employ electromagnetic 
forces for various practical and measurable ends,238 but would still 
exclude the pure “building blocks” of science or economic theory.239  
Importantly, though, O’Connor is careful not to conflate the 
concept of measurable “advances” with a requirement that the 
                                                 
 234. See id. 
 235. Id. at 1476 (“The key to restoring some order to the scope of patent 
eligible subject matter is to revive the concept of ‘useful arts.’”). 
 236. See id. 
 237. See id. at 1472 (“[Francis Bacon’s] resolute focus on practical and useful 
arts and his tripartite scheme of Memory, Reason, and Imagination (followed with 
some changes by the Encyclopédists) laid the groundwork for the category of ‘useful 
arts’ as those workings of natural materials for practical (i.e., physical well-being) 
ends, separate from arts with purely taste or sentiment ends.”); id. at 1474 (explaining 
that patent systems’ encouragement of “advances” in the art supports the “distinction 
between ‘progress’ fields that can be measured quantitatively and ‘taste’ or 
‘sentiment’ fields that can only be measured qualitatively”); see also id. at 1414 
(“[The] Quarrel of the Ancients and Moderns[, where] [a] central insight of the debate 
was that the output of some fields could be quantified and compared over time, while 
that of others could only be assessed on a qualitative basis. Progress in the former 
could be demonstrated because an attribute of a produced artifact was measurably 
stronger, faster, etc. Progress could not be demonstrated in the latter because its 
artifacts were valued subjectively based on ‘taste’ or ‘sentiment.’”). 
 238. See id. at 1429-30 (discussing automatically generating electronic 
communications and tracking customer behavior to increase conversions of cross-
sales and upsales, using computers to more efficiently or less expensively process 
accounting records or projections for complex businesses, or reducing online 
shopping friction by using certain combinations or various website functions). 
 239. See id. at 1429-30, 1475 (explaining this definition would also exclude 
the use of computers for non-practical purposes such as the creation of computer-
generated music or photography, for which the quality or improvements cannot be 
objectively measured). 
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invention be science-based, observing that “the products of a field can 
be measured quantitatively without the artisans practicing in it 
knowing much more than basic mathematics and the skills of their 
art.”240 This is consistent with Part II.A above, which shows that the 
use of computing technology for practical business purposes is 
supposed to be patent eligible under U.S. law even if it does not 
amount to the creation of new technology per se (as perhaps only 
electrical engineers and computer scientists might be able to 
accomplish). 
In short, O’Connor’s work makes a compelling case that the 
scope of patent systems is supposed to extend to all useful arts, rather 
than the narrower fields-of-technology subset thereof recited in 
TRIPS.241 Under either framing, however, uses of computer 
technology for practical, measurable business purposes are within the 
scope. Many, perhaps most, endeavors in those fields may not be 
“inventive” or ultimately patentable, but that is beside the point of 
whether the field itself is technological. 
It also appears that the norms of business methods have changed 
in recent years such that they now better align with other fields 
considered “technological.” That business methods were not widely 
considered patent-eligible when TRIPS was ratified, but became so 
afterwards at least in some member countries, might be largely a 
matter of timing. There were at least two major shifts that culminated 
right around the turn of the last century. The first is the advent of the 
Internet and the democratization of computing technology throughout 
the 1990s, which fundamentally changed how commerce and 
communication could be conducted and lowered barriers to enter a 
wide variety of markets. 
The second is the migration of information technology and 
engineering concepts and tools into business and finance fields over 
the latter half of the twentieth century. As John Duffy explained, “As 
early as the mid-twentieth century, engineers and physical scientists 
were already migrating into the academic realms of business, 
economics, and management.”242 By the late 1980s, a field dubbed 
“financial engineering,” for example, emerged and became 
                                                 
 240. See id. at 1474 (noting that “[a]t the same time, an artisan or even amateur 
can develop an entirely new art that is not measurable directly against existing arts 
but can still be quantitatively shown to address practical needs faster, cheaper, more 
effectively, etc.”). 
 241. See id. at 1397.  
 242. John F. Duffy, Why Business Method Patents?, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1247, 
1263 (2011). 
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increasingly prevalent.243 Around the same time, universities began 
creating business-focused engineering departments, placing those 
programs in their engineering schools.244 And from the 1990s through 
the present, many more top engineering universities began creating 
financial engineering degree programs and courses that have a 
foundation of scientific and mathematical rigor.245 Thus, it is probably 
not a coincidence that the critical mass of both these shifts coincided 
with the Federal Circuit’s 1998 State Street decision, which deemed 
patent-eligible any process with a “useful, concrete, and tangible 
result” and thereby permitted much broader patenting of business 
methods.246 
Finally, a broad, technology-neutral understanding of patentable 
subject matter has the benefit of avoiding premature exclusion of 
patent protection in emerging areas like computerized business 
methods.247 The Supreme Court’s decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty 
that read § 101 broadly to deem a genetically engineered bacterium 
patent-eligible248 arguably played a significant role in fostering a 
robust and innovative genetics and biotechnology industry in the 
U.S.249 Likewise, with the democratization of computing technology 
                                                 
 243. See id. at 1267-69. 
 244. Id. at 1268-69 (“[N]umerous universities have created courses, programs, 
laboratories, and even whole departments dedicated to the study of topics like 
financial engineering. A good example is Princeton University, which has created the 
Department of Operations Research and Financial Engineering as a center for the 
study of ‘engineering for business, commerce, and industry.’ Princeton, like other 
schools offering studies in this specialized field, has placed this department in its 
engineering school (specifically its School of Engineering and Applied Science).”). 
 245. See id. at 1269. 
 246. State Street Bank & Trust v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 
1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998); cf. Ben McEniery, Physicality and the Information Age: A 
Normative Perspective on the Patent Eligibility of Non-Physical Methods, 10 CHI.-
KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 106, 165 (2010) (“[F]rom a normative perspective, physicality 
has no role to play in patent eligibility, as a physicality requirement is an undesirable 
limitation on patentable subject matter. It essentially confines all process patents to 
manufacturing methods, using a test that may have been appropriate during the 
Industrial Age, but is no longer appropriate in an information-based economy.”). 
 247. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 607 (2010); In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 
290, 297 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Newman, J., dissenting) (“The nation has benefitted from 
the adaptability of the patent system to new technologies.”). 
 248. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (holding that the 
bacterium could be considered a “manufacture” or “composition of matter” under § 
101). 
 249. See Orozco, supra note 29, at 49; see also Stephen H. Haber, F. Scott 
Kief & Troy A. Paredes, On the Importance to Economic Success of Property Rights 
in Finance and Innovation, 26 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 215, 223 (2008) (“Although 
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in commercial endeavors, the best approach may be not to foreclose 
the vast majority of computerized business methods from entering the 
patent system to be judged on the merits.250 
D. Patentability Backstops 
Business methods that require no computers at all (e.g., the risk-
hedging method of Bilski) or that can be performed mentally are 
clearly non-technological.251 But, as demonstrated above, computer-
implemented business methods should easily be considered “fields of 
technology” for purposes of TRIPS Article 7(1).252 Such methods 
possess at least some practical, measurable characteristics, removing 
them from the kinds of subject matter measurable only in terms of taste 
or sentiment. Whether those technological endeavors are ultimately 
patentable or are merely old and obvious computerization techniques 
for well-known processes is where the relative “technological” merits 
should be evaluated on a spectrum.253  
                                                 
we recognize that numerous factors impact the growth of any industry, a natural 
reading of this data suggests that adding patents helped spur the U.S. biotechnology 
industry to be the most vibrant and competitive in the world, as measured by the 
number of competitors doing business in the area and the number of new products 
brought to market.”). 
 250. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 606 (“[T]he Court today is not commenting on the 
patentability of any particular invention, let alone holding that any of the above-
mentioned technologies from the Information Age should or should not receive patent 
protection. This Age puts the possibility of innovation in the hands of more people 
and raises new difficulties for the patent law.”). 
 251. See id. at 597-99. 
 252. But see Colleen V. Chien, Tailoring the Patent System to Work for 
Software and Technology Patents 2 (Santa Clara Univ. Sch. of Law, Nov. 16, 2012), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2176520 [https://perma.cc/ 
XAL5-DMDT]. Chien, whose work is discussed further below, contends that when 
TRIPS mandates protection for all fields of technology, that “does not mandate the 
patent-eligibility of methods of doing business, or the patenting of abstract claims that 
are devoid of technical detail.” See id. 
 253. Crouch & Merges, supra note 110, at 1691 (“[I]t is best not to try to map 
the swampy terrain of § 101 in any great detail. Whenever possible, we argue, try 
something else: just avoid it.”); see id. at 1686-87 (describing studies showing that 
84–94% of claims rejected on § 101 grounds in the USPTO are also rejected on other 
grounds, which “show[s] an exceptionally high rate of doctrinal overlap and lends 
credence to the idea that, by initially avoiding subject-matter-eligibility questions, 
many of those potential issues will be avoided”); McEniery, supra note 246, at 166 
(“Even though there are concerns about the patent system, and in particular business 
method and computer software patents, introducing a physicality requirement at the 
threshold is a suboptimal means of addressing these concerns. Rather, it is the 
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If the scope of “technology” is broad, it avoids turning away 
nascent fields at the door to the patent system. But that breadth at the 
threshold need not, and should not, translate into too many business 
method patents or excessively broad patent rights. Many, perhaps 
most, computerized business methods will not pass muster because the 
computer implementation itself will be technically obvious and 
because market pressure and common sense provide ample motivation 
for the automation of a plethora of business practices.254 Common 
“innovations” like taking pre-Internet processes and merely applying 
them to the Internet are easily found obvious.255 The post-Alice 
doctrine discussed above, by applying what is effectively an invention 
requirement, has essentially confirmed that computerized business 
methods will often, but not always, lack the requisite inventiveness to 
be patented. 
To take a rather extreme example,256 consider a patent claim 
directed to a digitally stored video recording of an advertisement. 
Assume that the digital file format is old and only the content of the 
advertisement itself is new. There is surely a technological link via the 
digitization, but in spirit the claim falls well outside of what we think 
of as patentable subject matter because the substance of the claim is 
the expressive subject matter that is best measured by taste or 
sentiment. A claim directed to such a digital file would nonetheless be 
                                                 
strictures of novelty, inventiveness and sufficiency of description that will exclude 
undeserving subject matter from patentability.”). 
 254. See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417-21 (2007) (in 
determining obviousness, “a court must ask whether the improvement is more than 
the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions,” and 
should consider what “design need[s] or market pressure[s]” are involved, what 
“common sense” might suggest, and what “ordinary skill” and “ordinary creativity” 
might accomplish); David Schumann, Obviousness with Business Methods, 56 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 727, 763 (2002) (“[T]o the extent that most businesses use computers 
extensively, a person of ordinary skill, given the opportunity, will computerize any 
procedure that can be computerized, regardless of the absence of a ‘suggestion or 
motivation’ in the prior art references. In light of this inherent or implicit motivation, 
the Federal Circuit should abandon its contrary presumption for computer-
implemented business methods, and adopt the presumption that a person of ordinary 
skill in the art is motivated to computerize existing business methods.”). 
 255. See, e.g., Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1326 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008), abrogated by Travel Sentry, Inc. v. Tropp, 877 F.3d 1370 (2017) 
(observing that web browser technology was conventional and well known, and that 
“the modification of Parity® to incorporate web browser functionality represents a 
combination of two well known prior art elements to a person of ordinary skill in the 
art”). 
 256. Thanks to Mark Lemley for posing a similar hypothetical about digital 
music to help flesh out this analysis. 
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within a field of technology because of its computer-implemented 
nature, which affords the claimed subject matter some objectively 
measurable characteristics, such as data storage efficiency, recording 
latency, etc. Although the creative content of the file might not lend 
itself to a typical obviousness analysis, the digital data would not be 
entitled to patentable weight under the “printed matter” doctrine.  
The printed matter doctrine has long excluded from patent 
protection arrangements of expressive or informative text where a 
significant or the sole “difference between the claimed subject matter 
and the prior art lies in the content of the information.”257 Put another 
way, the doctrine will “not give patentable weight to printed matter 
absent a new and unobvious functional relationship between the 
printed matter and the substrate.”258 Digitally stored data might 
sometimes possess a functional relationship to the disk that stores the 
data, as in the case of software that “dictates how application programs 
manage information.”259 Ordinary stored digital data, however, differs 
from the prior art only in its content.260 While a new digital file 
structure or storage format might overcome this hurdle, mere digital 
music, movies, and other expressive content, though within a field of 
technology, are unpatentable.261 
                                                 
 257. In re Miller, 418 F.2d 1392, 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (“In this instance the 
claimed indicia and legend, being merely placed on the claimed structure in any 
desired location and manner, do not produce the required cooperative structural 
relationship necessary before the printed matter can be given patentable weight.”); In 
re Russell, 48 F.2d 668, 669 (C.C.P.A. 1931) (stating that “[t]he mere arrangement of 
printed matter on a sheet or sheets of paper, in book form or otherwise,” is not 
patentable).  
 258. In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 259. See, e.g., id. at 1583 (explaining that printed matter typically concerns 
information that is “useful and intelligible only to the human mind,” whereas software 
is designed only to be computer-readable); see id. (holding that the data structures 
claimed involve more than “merely the information content of a memory,” but provide 
functionality that actively “manages information” and “provide[s] increased 
computing efficiency”). 
 260. See id. at 1584. 
 261. Cf. Ex parte Carver, 227 U.S.P.Q. 465, 1985 WL 71927, at *5 (B.P.A.I. 
Aug. 30, 1985) (concurring opinion) (agreeing that claims directed to a sound 
recording were directed to statutory subject matter, but concluding that the claims 
were unpatentable because “[t]he only difference between the claimed sound 
recording and prior art sound recordings resides in the recorded sound pattern on the 
substrate”); Ex parte S, No. 109, 25 J. PATENT OFF. SOC’Y 904, 904 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 4, 
1943) (analogizing printed matter on paper to sound recordings on records). The 
opinion expressed concern that  
[i]f the subject matter contained on the record could be considered as a 
material limitation in appraising the patentable novelty of the combination, 
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III. THE DISCRIMINATION CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED BY OTHER  
TRIPS PROVISIONS  
Although broad, TRIPS Article 27(1)’s non-discrimination 
provision is qualified in significant ways.262 Article 27(2) allows 
members to exclude from patent protection subject matter as necessary 
to “protect ordre public or morality,” giving examples such as 
protecting human life or serious prejudice to the environment.263 
Article 27(3) permits member countries to exclude some specific 
subject matter from patent protection, such as medical diagnostic and 
treatment methods, as well as plants and animals other than 
microorganisms.264 And Article 30 permits unspecified “limited 
exceptions” to a patent owner’s exclusive rights, with two caveats to 
ensure that the patent right is not unduly diminished by the exception: 
The exception must not (1) “unreasonably conflict with a normal 
exploitation of the patent,” or (2) “unreasonably prejudice the 
legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the 
legitimate interests of third parties.”265  
Colleen Chien believes that the flexibility provided by these 
exceptions is an “open secret” that permits TRIPS members to treat 
different inventions differently in a number of contexts, despite Article 
27(1).266 Aside from the CBM program, Chien points to three 
examples of what she considers proper invention discrimination in 
U.S. patent law: (1) 35 U.S.C. § 287(c), which prevents doctors from 
being liable for infringement by performing medical or surgical 
procedures; (2) 35 U.S.C. § 271(e), which exempts from liability 
certain acts with respect to drugs and biological materials for the 
purpose of obtaining regulatory approval; and (3) the prohibition on 
patenting tax strategies under AIA § 14.267 But these are poor 
analogues to the current law concerning business method patents. 
The § 287(c) exemption for medical and surgical procedures is 
not a restriction on patentability, but a limitation on enforceability. It 
                                                 
a large number of records containing widely differing kinds of novel and 
meritorious subject matter, such as classroom lectures, advertising 
formulas, music, experimental data and many other subjects could be 
presented for patent. 
Id. at 905. 
 262. See TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 27(1). 
 263. Id. art. 27(2). 
 264. See id. art. 27(3). 
 265. Id. art. 30. 
 266. Chien, supra note 252, at 1. 
 267. See id. 
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implicates Article 27(1) as well as Article 30.268 Although “suspect” 
under Article 27(1) because it limits patent enforceability only as to a 
specified class of subject matter,269 the medical procedures exemption 
is arguably acceptable under Article 30 because it is narrowly 
defined,270 still allows for significant alternative enforcement 
options,271 and involves a legitimate public interest in doctors being 
able to save lives without fear of infringement liability.272 The fact that 
medical procedures, unlike business methods, are expressly allowed 
under TRIPS Article 27(3) to be excluded outright from patent 
                                                 
 268. Article 30’s “limited exceptions” are subject to Article 27(1)’s non-
discrimination requirement. See Canadian Pharmaceuticals, supra note 46, at 170-71 
(“Article 30 exceptions are explicitly described as ‘exceptions to the exclusive rights 
conferred by a patent’ and contain no indication that any exemption from non-
discrimination rules is intended. A discriminatory exception that takes away 
enjoyment of a patent right is discrimination as much as is discrimination in the basic 
rights themselves. . . . [T]he anti-discrimination rule of Article 27.1 does apply to 
exceptions of the kind authorized by Article 30.”). 
 269. Thomas, supra note 29, 1142-43 (“Given the TRIPS Agreement mandate 
that patent rights be enjoyable without discrimination as to the field of technology, 
even the recent amendment concerning medical methods appears suspect.”); id. at 
1177 (“Under a strict reading of the TRIPS Agreement, § 287(c) presents a violation 
of this agreement: signatories may deny such patents altogether but once issued, may 
not refuse to grant such patent holders the full panoply of rights and remedies 
available to other patentees.”). 
 270. Canadian Pharmaceuticals, supra note 46, at 156 (“With no limitations 
at all upon the quantity of production, the stockpiling exception removes that 
protection entirely during the last six months of the patent term, without regard to 
what other, subsequent, consequences it might have. By this effect alone, the 
stockpiling exception can be said to abrogate such rights entirely during the time it is 
in effect.”). By contrast, one regulation at issue in Canadian Pharmaceuticals would 
have allowed unlimited stockpiling of patented drugs for the six-month period leading 
up to the patent’s expiration, which the WTO panel deemed a “substantial 
curtailment” of patent rights, not a limited exception. See id. at 155-56 (“The term 
‘limited exception’ must therefore be read to connote a narrow exception - one which 
makes only a small diminution of the rights in question . . . . [T]he question of whether 
the stockpiling exception is a ‘limited’ exception turns on the extent to which the 
patent owner’s rights to exclude ‘making’ and ‘using’ the patented product have been 
curtailed.”). 
 271. The § 287(c) exemption also does not limit enforceability against doctors 
and hospitals using patented machines, drugs, or biotechnologies and leaves room for 
indirect liability as to other entities that induce or contribute to the performance of the 
patented medical procedure. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1)-(2)(A) (2012); Canadian 
Pharmaceuticals, supra note 46, at 161 (“The normal practice of exploitation by 
patent owners, as with owners of any other intellectual property right, is to exclude all 
forms of competition that could detract significantly from the economic returns 
anticipated from a patent’s grant of market exclusivity.”). 
 272. See Chien, supra note 29, at 478. 
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protection, and may also be justified as necessary to “protect human . 
. . life or health” under Article 27(2), also places § 287(c) on solid 
ground for TRIPS compliance.273 
The § 271(e) exemption, which allows generic drug makers to 
perform activities to complete regulatory review before the branded 
drug patent expires, is similarly limited, supported by important public 
health policy, and essentially identical to the Canadian regulatory 
review exemption found to comply with Article 30 in Canadian 
Pharmaceuticals.274 And AIA § 14 is limited to precluding patents on 
“strateg[ies] for reducing, avoiding, or deferring tax liability,” which 
are facially non-technological, and specifically does not apply to any 
                                                 
 273. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 27(2)-(3). 
 274. Similar to the Bolar exemption codified in 35 U.S.C. § 271(e), the 
challenged Section 55.2(1) of the Canadian Patent Act provided: 
It is not an infringement of a patent for any person to make, construct, use 
or sell the patented invention solely for uses reasonably related to the 
development and submission of information required under any law of 
Canada, a province or a country other than Canada that regulates the 
manufacture, construction, use or sale of any product. 
Canadian Pharmaceuticals, supra note 46, at 2. The WTO panel found that the 
regulation was: 
“[L]imited” because of the narrow scope of its curtailment of Article 28.1 
rights. As long as the exception is confined to conduct needed to comply 
with the requirements of the regulatory approval process, the extent of the 
acts unauthorized by the right holder that are permitted by it will be small 
and narrowly bounded. 
Id. at 158. The regulation did not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of 
the patent because it effectively took away an abnormal de facto extension of the 
patent term caused by the regulatory review process. Id. at 161 (“The additional period 
of market exclusivity in this situation is not a natural or normal consequence of 
enforcing patent rights. It is an unintended consequence of the conjunction of the 
patent laws with product regulatory laws, where the combination of patent rights with 
the time demands of the regulatory process gives a greater than normal period of 
market exclusivity to the enforcement of certain patent rights. It is likewise a form of 
exploitation that most patent owners do not in fact employ.”). And the normative 
debate did not strongly demonstrate any legitimate interest on the part of patent 
owners who opposed the law. Id. at 168 (“[T]he interest claimed on behalf of patent 
owners whose effective period of market exclusivity had been reduced by delays in 
marketing approval was neither so compelling nor so widely recognized that it could 
be regarded as a ‘legitimate interest’ within the meaning of Article 30 of the TRIPS 
Agreement.”). The regulatory review law therefore passed muster under Article 30. 
Id. at 169 (“Having reviewed the conformity of Section 55.2(1) with each of the three 
conditions for an exception under Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement, the Panel 
concluded that Section 55.2(1) does satisfy all three conditions of Article 30, and thus 
is not inconsistent with Canada’s obligations under Article 28.1 of the TRIPS 
Agreement.”). 
 Business Methods, Technology, and Discrimination 367 
other methods or devices that are used to prepare tax returns or are 
otherwise separable from the tax strategy itself.275  
The law discriminating against computerized business methods 
and the CBM program cannot be lumped together with any of these 
examples. The doctrine, as applied, is preventing the vast majority of 
computerized business methods from being patent eligible, and the 
CBM program deliberately targets such patents for special invalidity 
proceedings where the patent owner is uniquely disadvantaged.276 As 
demonstrated above, this discrimination is de jure, or at least de facto, 
and solely on the basis of subject matter.277 And if the stockpiling 
exception in Canadian Pharmaceuticals, which only affected the 
enforceability of the patent against specific manufacturing and storage 
activities during the last six months of the patent term, was not a 
permissible “limited exception” to the patent right, it is hard to 
imagine how a complete prohibition on patenting certain subject 
matter could be appropriately “limited.”278 The primary focus of 
Article 27 concerns discrimination in the form of denying patent rights 
altogether, not limiting the scope or enforceability of those rights.279 
Nor can the doctrine or the CBM program be justified by the 
“legitimate interests of third parties” under Article 30.280 While there 
                                                 
 275. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 14, 125 Stat. 
284, 327-28 (2011). Accord H.R. REP. NO. 110-314, at 38-39 (2007) (expressing the 
view that similar provisions excluding tax strategies from patenting would comply 
with TRIPS). 
 276. See generally supra Part I. 
 277. See supra Part I. 
 278. See Canadian Pharmaceuticals, supra note 46, at 156. Canadian 
Pharmaceuticals also states: 
With no limitations at all upon the quantity of production, the stockpiling 
exception removes that protection entirely during the last six months of the 
patent term, without regard to what other, subsequent, consequences it 
might have. By this effect alone, the stockpiling exception can be said to 
abrogate such rights entirely during the time it is in effect. 
Id. 
 279. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 27(1) (referring first to ensuring that patent 
rights are “available for any inventions” in all technological fields, while Articles 
27(2)-(3) provide exceptions where members may “exclude from patentability” 
certain subject matter); see also Canadian Pharmaceuticals, supra note 46, at 105 
(“The principal form of discrimination on the grounds of the field of technology 
contemplated in Article 27.1 was that of denial of patent rights altogether – this was 
the subject of the specific exceptions to this rule in the subsequent paragraphs of 
Article 27.”). 
 280. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 30. While TRIPS Article 30 would also consider 
the legitimate interest of the patent owner, here they believed right to patent protection 
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are many who are targeted by abusive PAE lawsuits involving such 
patents, and there is a need to curtail such litigation abuses, the law 
does not target the abuse—the law targets the patent rights per se, 
regardless of the owner’s identity or conduct.281 Eliminating patents on 
a particular subject matter is, at best, oblique to such interests. Plus, as 
Stefania Fusco notes, the broader debate about the costs and benefits 
of non-practicing entities in the U.S. has not reached a consensus,282 
which weighs against considering such factors as “legitimate 
interests” that warrant a limited exception for patent rights.283 
                                                 
is a legal interest rather than a normative “legitimate interest.” See Canadian 
Pharmaceuticals, supra note 46, at 164. Canadian Pharmaceuticals further states: 
To make sense of the term “legitimate interests” in this context, that term 
must be defined in the way that it is often used in legal discourse – a 
normative claim calling for protection of interests that are “justifiable” in 
the sense that they are supported by relevant public policies or other social 
norms . . . . [T]he reference to the “legitimate interests of third parties” 
makes sense only if the term “legitimate interests” is construed as a concept 
broader than legal interests. 
Id. at 164-65. 
 281. See supra Part II.B. Other actions taken to target litigation conduct 
instead of the patents themselves might be justified under TRIPS. See Chien, supra 
note 252, at 2 (explaining that the proposed SHIELD Act, which would help shift fees 
against PAEs who bring frivolous patent infringement suits, might be justified under 
TRIPS Article 30 because “[t]here is no ‘legitimate interest’ in imposing millions of 
dollars in defense costs based on a non-meritorious suit, or in racking up legal fees 
that far exceed the economic value of the patent, when a reasonable offer of settlement 
has been made”). “The insight that [PAEs] are going after the innocent users of 
technology such as wifi, scanners, and ecommerce protocols, could be used to craft 
some sort of innocent user exception to infringement.” Id.  
 282. Fusco, supra note 10, at 154 (“[W]ould the intent to limit NPE activity 
be considered a legitimate purpose for excluding business methods and software from 
patent protection? The answer to this question is difficult to determine, given the fact 
that, as mentioned, even in the U.S. there is no consensus with respect to the role of 
NPEs within the patent system.”). Fusco also asks: “How much weight should a WTO 
panel give to what is considered to be legitimate in the country in which the provision 
operates as opposed to the situation in other countries? Which TRIPS provisions could 
be used to inform the legitimacy concept in this context?” Id. at 154-55. 
 283. Canadian Pharmaceuticals, supra note 46, at 166. Because “legitimate 
interests” are normative in nature, a lack of consensus likely precludes an interest from 
being “legitimate” for Article 30 purposes. See id. In Canadian Pharmaceuticals, for 
example, “[t]he EC argued that patent owners who suffer a reduction of effective 
market exclusivity from [regulatory] delays should be entitled to impose the same 
type of delay in connection with corresponding regulatory requirements upon the 
market entry of competing products.” Id. The panel rejected the argument that the 
patent owner’s regulatory delay reflected a legitimate interest in delaying competitors’ 
entry into a drug market. See id. at 167-68. The evidence showed that although some 
countries had granted patent owners term extensions to compensate for the lost term, 
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Finally, while Article 27(2) does allow ordre public or morality 
exceptions for patentability, those exceptions are inapplicable here.284 
The U.S. does not invoke a broad ordre public-based hurdle to 
patentability.285 But the European Union does, and as the European 
Patent Office says in its Guidelines for Examination:  
This [ordre public or morality] provision is likely to be invoked only in rare 
and extreme cases. A fair test to apply is to consider whether it is probable 
that the public in general would regard the invention as so abhorrent that 
the grant of patent rights would be inconceivable.286  
Computerized business methods do not likely rise to this level of 
moral outage, like patents directed to cloning human beings or using 
human embryos for commercial purposes, for example.287 Litigation 
abuse involving computerized business method patents does not 
warrant an ordre public or morality exclusion of such patents either.288 
As the EPO itself explains, “The mere possibility of abuse of an 
invention is not sufficient to deny patent protection . . . if the invention 
                                                 
other countries allowed a regulatory exception for generics but did not grant a 
corresponding term extension to the patent owner: 
In addition to Canada, several countries have adopted, or are in the process 
of adopting, regulatory review exceptions similar to Section 55.2(1) of the 
Canadian Patent Act, thereby removing the de facto extension of market 
exclusivity, but these countries have not enacted, and are not planning to 
enact, any de jure extensions of the patent term for producers adversely 
affected by delayed marketing approval. When regulatory review 
exceptions are enacted in this manner, they represent a decision not to 
restore any of the period of market exclusivity due to lost delays in obtaining 
marketing approval. Taken as a whole, these government decisions may 
represent either disagreement with the normative claim made by the EC in 
this proceeding, or they may simply represent a conclusion that such claims 
are outweighed by other equally legitimate interests. 
Id. at 168.  
 284. Taketa, supra note 223, at 964 (“Because it would take a leap of logic to 
conclude that business methods would endanger public morality, or ordre public, 
business methods are not likely to fall into the category of specifically excluded 
subject matter under TRIPS.”). 
 285. See id. 
 286. Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office, EUR. PATENT 
OFF. pt. G, ch. 2, § 4.1 (2017), http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-
texts/html/guidelines/e/g_ii_4_1.htm [https://perma.cc/P3N9-B76R] [hereinafter 
EUR. PATENT OFF.].  
 287. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 112-29, § 33, 125 Stat. 284, 
340 (2011) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no patent may issue on a 
claim directed to or encompassing a human organism.”); EUR. PATENT OFF., supra 
note 286, at pt. G, ch. 2, § 5.3 (listing biotechnology inventions that are deemed to be 
unpatentable on ordre public or morality grounds). 
 288. EUR. PATENT OFF., supra note 286, pt. G, ch. 2, § 4.1. 
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can also be exploited in a way which does not and would not infringe 
‘ordre public’ and morality.”289  
The PAE phenomenon, even if morally offensive and against 
public policy, is not a proper reason to discriminate against patenting 
computerized business methods in the first place, even though those 
patents happen to be the types of patents often favored by PAEs. Nor 
does the general subject matter of “business methods” likely lend itself 
to arguably immoral conduct, like patenting tax strategies specifically 
might incentivize the exploitation of tax loopholes, as Congress once 
determined.290 Broadly taking away the ability to seek or enjoy patent 
protection for all computerized business methods is not justifiable on 
moral grounds. 
Finally, Chien suggests that the discrimination against 
computer-implemented processes might be better viewed as a 
functional discrimination rather than discrimination based on subject 
matter.291 Pointing to the law of contributory infringement, which 
provides that “staple article[s] or commodit[ies] of commerce suitable 
for substantial noninfringing use” are immunized from infringement 
liability,292 Chien contends that “[p]erhaps this favorable treatment 
should be extended, as it is the building blocks of modern commerce—
smartphones and online commerce—that are under the greatest attack 
today.”293 This notion has great policy appeal, especially to those who 
would embrace the jurisdictional view of § 101. But the law of 
contributory infringement is a limitation on enforceability, not 
patentability, and to recast it as a prohibition on patenting certain 
functional elements would indeed require a major “exten[sion]” of the 
law of § 101, if not also §§ 102 and 103.294 Although a more focused 
type of discrimination might be justifiable on some of the grounds 
noted above, here the existing law—and particularly the CBM 
program—discriminates based on the general type of claimed subject 
matter, not the invocation of specific kinds of technological tools.  
                                                 
 289. Id. 
 290. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-314, at 38-39 (2007) (suggesting that a ban on tax 
strategy patents would be justified under TRIPS Article 27(3), which “allows 
members to exclude from patentability inventions that are necessary to protect ordre 
public or morality,” because such patents would be contrary to tax policy and would 
incentivize exploitation of tax loopholes). 
 291. See Chien, supra note 252, at 2-3. 
 292. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2012). 
 293. Chien, supra note 252, at 3. 
 294. See id. 
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CONCLUSION 
Computer-implemented business methods are, and should be 
treated as, a field of technology under TRIPS. Textually, historically, 
and normatively, those kinds of methods possess the technological 
involvement and objectively measurable qualities that are well within 
the proper scope of patent systems. Whether such methods are 
inventive or such patents are valuable and enforceable is beside the 
point and should be tested elsewhere. 
TRIPS does not tolerate the kind of discrimination that the 
United States employs with respect to computer-implemented 
business methods. The Alice doctrine and the CBM program 
disadvantage these kinds of inventions in ways that do not correspond 
to anything unique about the subject matter. Computer-implemented 
business methods are essentially singled out as the poster child for 
vague, overbroad claims that are abusively asserted, but they are not 
the only low-quality patents that are being wielded in unsavory ways, 
and they should not be treated as if they are. Whether those claims are 
ultimately patentable should turn on the quality of the invention, not 
the field of technology. Nor should we single out a type of invention 
because we disfavor how certain owners of those patents have been 
behaving. 
There are plenty of ways to get at the problems that have been 
highlighted with computer-implemented business method patents. As 
to patent quality, better examination for claim precision and 
novelty/nonobviousness will improve the situation for all patents, 
including business methods. As to litigation abuse, proposals such as 
heightened pleading requirements, mandatory disclosures, discovery 
efficiencies, and fee shifting can help to prevent or discourage bad 
actors.  
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As the United States considers new proposals to modify the 
scope of patentable subject matter, as well as proposals to extend or 
expand the CBM program, it should be more mindful of these TRIPS 
obligations. We should look at both the forest and the trees, but we 
should not discriminate against individual trees because of things that 
plague the entire forest.295 
                                                 
 295. Lemley & Melamed, supra note 21, at 2180 (“Patent trolls are taking the 
rap for problems with the patent system. That is not to say trolls are not a problem; 
they are a large and growing one. But they are not the problem. Rather, they are a 
symptom of systemic issues the patent system faces in the IT industry—too many 
patents interpreted too broadly, a remedy system that routinely awards excessive 
damages and enables patent holders to bargain for excessively costly settlements, and 
an enormous royalty stacking problem. Practicing entities, as well as trolls, can and 
do take advantage of these issues. Rather than focusing on the trolls—the symptoms—
the law should turn its attention to the disease itself.”). 
